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HARMONIZING CURRENT THREATS: USING THE OUTCRY
FOR LEGAL EDUCATION REFORMS TO TAKE ANOTHER
LOOK AT CIVIL GIDEON AND WHAT IT MEANS TO BE AN
AMERICAN LAWYER
Cathryn Miller-Wilson*
Drawing from the broad and varied literature on legal ethics, this paper
demonstrates that legal education and access to justice concerns can and
should be addressed simultaneously in our current political and economic
climate. Current threats to legal education, and to lawyering in general, present an opportunity for legal education transformation. Applying legal ethics
theory to an analysis of these threats provides support for the creation of
teaching law firms, similar in size and scope to teaching hospitals, that will
employ clinical teaching methodology, substantially enhance ethics teaching
and significantly address the issue of access to justice.

INTRODUCTION
Since my law school days, I have thought about the medical
school education model. I had struggled with a relatively confusing legal education that failed to bridge the gap between “thinking like a
lawyer” and actually practicing law, despite a clinical course, externships, summer jobs, and voluntary student projects. Wouldn’t it be
wonderful, I thought, to have had the opportunity after receiving my
J.D., to practice in a teaching law firm—like a teaching hospital—a
large supervised setting with many rotations? Through live client representation, I could rotate through a variety of substantive areas, having myriad opportunities to represent clients in a diverse array of contexts. I would not only be able to utilize such an intensive experience
to bridge the theory/practice gap, but also to be exposed to a wide variety of areas before having to specialize.
*
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Over the years, I mentioned these musings to friends and colleagues, many of whom agreed that such a model would be interesting
and perhaps better than existing models. Ultimately, however, the conversation always turned to two seemingly intractable problems: 1) the
cost of such a venture was too prohibitive to make it worth pursuing
beyond a casual conversation and 2) ultimately, the analogy between
hospitals and law firms failed because the nature of the work was too
different.
Meanwhile, while I mused, I practiced public interest law. I
was fortunate to spend the better part of seventeen years providing legal assistance to those who truly needed it. During those years, I
learned hard lessons about how difficult it is to practice public interest
law: how enormous the need is and how small the available resources
are. While I practiced, the resources shrunk and the need grew. In my
own small world, I tried to expand the capacity of our agency’s ability
to serve by developing mentoring programs and providing training for
pro bono volunteers, supervising certified legal interns, and collaborating with other public interest agencies to try to share the workload. I
tried to get fellowships for my agency so that we could hire more lawyers, and I, along with my colleagues, participated annually in letterwriting campaigns for donations and fundraising events for our agency. At the end of every fiscal year, after reviewing the growing numbers of clients and legal matters that our agency handled, we discussed
the funding cuts and what we were going to do about them. Federal
and state funders were constantly attacking legal services, and it didn’t
feel as if things could get any bleaker.
Then the financial crisis hit. Thousands of people lost their jobs
and, consequently, their health insurance; their sources of income; and
their ability to pay their utility bills, rent, or mortgages. 1 We saw many
more homeless clients. Our clients were sicker, and their access to
health care became increasingly difficult. They had trouble keeping
their utilities on and difficulty obtaining the money necessary to come
to our offices, keep their medical appointments, or pay the co-pays for
their medications. Surely, we thought, the time has come for the gov1

Michael D. Hurd & Susann Rohwedder, Effects of the Financial Crisis and
Great Recession on American Households 20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 16407, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16407;
Press Release, Public Agenda, Four in 10 Americans Struggle to Pay the Bills, Anxious About Maintaining Middle Class Life (Feb. 3, 2011), available at
http://www.publicagenda.org/files/pdf/struggling-in-america-press-release.pdf.

Miller-Wilson

2013]

7/11/2013 4:11 PM

HARMONIZING CURRENT THREATS

51

ernment to recognize the importance of legal services. However, that
dream was not to be. The funding cuts continued as the federal and
state government dealt with the fall-out of the financial crises and their
own shrinking budgets.2
In the midst of all of this, the financial crisis hit law firms and
law schools. Suddenly, legal education and its connection—or lack
thereof—to law jobs was in the news constantly. Corporations that had
suffered great financial hits since 2008 were no longer willing to pay
exorbitant fees for new “untrained” lawyers.3 Jobless graduates and
frustrated firms turned to the law schools to demand greater accountability.
I saw an opportunity. What if all of these phenomena—the legal services crisis, the law firm changes, the legal education criticisms—could be viewed as parts of a whole? If connections could be
drawn between a variety of legal system failures and legal education,
perhaps it could be argued that the time had come to make legal education a public responsibility. And if that time had come, perhaps the political will could be found to support legal education financially and to
assist law schools in developing a teaching law firm that would: 1)
tremendously expand the legal resources available to the indigent; 2)
enhance ethical training for lawyers by creating an environment that
produced live ethical issues and the time and space to explore them
with colleagues and professors, and through theoretical readings related to the dilemmas that they faced in their representation; 3) provide a
diverse array of rotations that would permit new lawyers to experience
several substantive legal areas, gaining practical experience without
leaving behind the opportunity to continue their theoretical legal education; and 4) create jobs for practitioner law-professors, providing an
expansion of the legal marketplace.
This paper makes the argument that, as with medical education
after the 1950s, it is time to take public responsibility for legal education.4 Medical education, as traced by William Rothstein, changed a
2

Press Release, Legal Services Corp., House-Senate Agreement Cuts LSC
Funding (Nov. 15, 2011), available at http://www.lsc.gov/media/pressreleases/house-senate-agreement-cuts-lsc-funding.
3
Ashby Jones & Joseph Palazzolo, What’s a First-Year Lawyer Worth?,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2011, at B1.
4
WILLIAM G. ROTHSTEIN, AMERICAN MEDICAL SCHOOLS AND THE PRACTICE
OF MEDICINE: A HISTORY 224–25 (1987).
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great deal after 1950 in large part because of the advances in medicine,
which created greater public need and support for public funding. 5 As
one famous physician and medical educator noted in 1953:
It is increasingly the opinion of all medical educators that the financial support of our medical
schools is inadequate, particularly if the needs
of the nation for health and medical services are
to be met in a manner consistent with our expanding body of scientific knowledge and the
demands of our people.6
While there has not been an “expanding body” of legal knowledge,
there certainly has been a tremendous increase in the number and
complexity of our laws.7 The need for a legal representative in civil litigation contexts has risen dramatically, along with the direness of the
consequences of proceeding without a lawyer.8 The current level of
public financial support for legal services is insufficient and, as I argue, will remain so unless the funding is connected not only to the
provision of legal services but also to educating future lawyers.
At the very least, using philosopher and legal ethicist David
Luban’s conception of the morally activist lawyer,9 I believe that lawyers and their regulatory institutions should take greater responsibility
for solving the current crisis in poverty legal services delivery by marrying it to the issues in legal education that exist today. As I discuss in
greater detail below, if lawyers make resolving these issues together a
priority, lawyers can use their powers of persuasion to convince the
public of the value of supporting legal education’s transformation.
To make the case for public support of the creation of teaching
law firms, I start with two assumptions that, for purposes of this paper,
I will hold as truisms: 1) access to justice for all in this country is at an
all-time low and 2) legal education, as we have known it for the past
5

Id.
Id. at 179 (quoting Ward Darley).
7
Over-Regulated America: The Home of Laissez-Faire is Being Suffocated by
Excessive and Badly Written Regulation, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2012 at 9.
8
Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37,
41 (2010).
9
See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY xxii (1988).
6
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roughly one hundred years, is problematic and needs to be “fixed.”
There is a great deal of debate about the nature and extent of the “fix”
that is necessary, but I will focus narrowly on the debates regarding
ethical education of lawyers and the call for more “practice ready”
lawyers.
This is not to say that I agree with every critic: I do not think
law schools need to be more akin to trade schools and less venues for
pondering legal theory,10 nor do I think that law school needs to be
simply cheaper or simply shorter as many have written. 11 I believe
deeply in the value of well-rounded education, both generally and for
the effective lawyer. What both sides in the practice/theory debate
seem to continually miss is the importance of mastering the theoretical
understanding of law and its practical application for both the theoretician and the practitioner. Failing to take some time to experience law
in action diminishes a necessary real-world understanding of how the
theories developed in the classroom actually function and what one
can learn from that experience and re-apply in the classroom. Similarly, failing to ground what one is seeing and doing in theory leaves one
unable to broaden and deepen one’s experience and to learn from it.
For these reasons, my proposal involves the creation of a post-J.D.
teaching law firm that marries experiential and theoretical pedagogies
in an effort to teach future practicing lawyers how to apply the theory
that they’ve already learned to real-world practice situations and to re10

See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The
Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1236
(1991) (arguing that teaching the “practice of law” has been removed from the law
school curriculum, leaving graduates unprepared for legal practice); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession,
91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992) (positing that emphasis on theory rather than ethical
practice has called into question the practice of law as an “honorable profession”).
11
See, e.g., Richard A. Matasar, Does the Current Economic Model of Legal
Education Work for Law Schools, Law Firms (or Anyone Else)?, 82 N.Y. ST. B.A. J.,
Oct. 2010, at 20, 21 (discussing rising costs of legal education and how it exacerbates economic plight of students unable to attain sufficient post-graduation employment); Preble Stolz, The Two-Year Law School: The Day the Music Died, 25 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 37, 39–40 (1973) (discussing the attempts and failure to create twoyear law schools); Christopher T. Cunniffe, The Case for the Alternative Third-Year
Program, 61 ALB. L. REV. 85, 129–30 (1997) (arguing for an “alternative third-year
program” where “students may receive compensation for externship experience”);
Mitu Gulati, Richard Sander & Robert Sockloskie, The Happy Charade: An Empirical Examination of the Third Year of Law School, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235, 266
(2001) (critiquing third year of law school as “largely irrelevant”).
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ceive continual grounding in theory throughout their experiential education. Therefore, discussions about legal education reform prior to
obtaining a J.D. degree are beyond the scope of this paper.
This is not to suggest that traditional law schools should remain
exactly as they are. Borrowing from general conceptions of strategic
planning theory, however, I believe it is most effective to start with the
end goal and work backwards. The legal education reform discussion
therefore starts with the question: What are the goals of legal education? Many suggest the answer is that the goals are and should be
broader than “simply” teaching people how to become lawyers. The
problem with this response is not that it is untrue or even true only for
a small subset of law school graduates. It is that it reduces the art and
science of effective lawyering to some kind of simplistic definition
unworthy of legal education’s focus. If we can agree that learning effective, ethical lawyering thought processes, practices, and skills is
complex, multi-faceted, and useful in both a utilitarian and philosophical sense, then it is not difficult to agree that teaching effective lawyering thought processes, practices, and skills is a goal for legal education. It is this very complexity of what it means to become an effective
lawyer that law schools have struggled to address. In an effort to try to
discover why this struggle has been so difficult for us, it is useful to
look to other analogously complex professions, such as the medical
one, to determine how they resolve or attempt to resolve this struggle.
Because this paper proposes a teaching law firm modeled after
a teaching hospital, some discussion of medical education in general
will be helpful to an understanding of why this particular model is one
that I am proposing for addressing both the access to justice issue and
the legal education crisis. Regarding the education issue alone, medical education has within it a very similar debate raging between theory
and practice, framed as a debate between scientific research and applied medicine. Therefore, an examination of their efforts to resolve
the seeming conflict between the two will help our discussion.
The questions that I address are: first, why should we, as lawyers, make access to justice not simply a concern but a central concern,
so that part of our definition of effective lawyering includes a lawyer
who is actively engaged in trying to solve the access to justice problem? Related to this question is what this problem has to do with legal
education. In Part I of this Article, I explore the connections between
access to justice, legal education, and ethical theories of lawyers’ role.
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Second, if I have persuaded you that ensuring access to justice
is actually an obligation, rather than merely an aspiration, of an effective lawyer, then how do we address this concern, whether effective
lawyer-practitioners, lawyer-professors, lawyer-policymakers, or lawyer-entrepreneurs? My proposal is that we address the concern through
the creation of a teaching law firm. Part II of my Article focuses on the
medical education model—specifically the incorporation of teaching
hospitals into its overall educational scheme—and whether there is a
way, despite the obvious differences, to make this model translatable
into a legal education model. To an extent, this section focuses on
medical pedagogy and the effectiveness of the teaching hospital in addressing both the problems of access to quality health care for the poor
and ensuring that our health care providers are effective. I also survey
the literature about the research scientist versus practicing doctor debate. From there, we can determine what pedagogies would be most
useful to emulate in the legal education context and describe the details of our teaching law firm.
Third, how we can create the teaching law firm? Part III of this
Article addresses the inevitable economic question of how we can sustain a teaching law firm. Having provided the theoretical justifications
for lawyers’ responsibilities for addressing the access to justice issue
and teaching and learning a new conception of ethical lawyering in
Part I, and the educational justifications for discharging these responsibilities by supporting and creating a teaching law firm in Part II,
what are the economic justifications and practical considerations for
seeking and using government support for this? Embedded in the question of practical considerations are the concerns, which I will also address, about the real differences between lawyering and doctoring and
how those differences impact a legal education proposal that is modeled after a medical one.
I. THE “MORALLY ACTIVIST” LAWYER AND THE ACCESS
TO JUSTICE ISSUE
I start by introducing a radical re-conception of lawyering and
lawyers’ role created and described by philosopher and legal ethicist,
David Luban, in his 1988 book Lawyers and Justice.12 I am interested
in this re-conception not only because I am intellectually sympathetic
with the theory, but also because it has captured my imagination in
12

LUBAN, supra note 9, at xxii.
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thinking about how this re-conceptualization could be taught and what
kinds of differences the teaching of this theory could make for lawyers
and the justice system.
As stated in his introduction, Luban wrote the book in an effort
to respond to societal complaints about the public perceptions of the
disconnect between law and justice.13 Interested in debunking this
claim and finding a way to reconnect law and justice, he examines
lawyers and lawyering in two parts. In the first half of the book, he details and challenges the dominant picture, or “standard conception,” of
lawyering—one that is based on three principles: 1) the theory of role
morality (dealing with conflicts between “role morality” and “common
morality”); 2) the adversary system excuse (excusing lawyers from
common moral obligations to non-clients because of their duties to
their own clients); and 3) the standard conception of lawyers’ role
(consisting of the principles of non-accountability and partisanship).14
Note that the conversation about lawyers’ role and common
morality is a lengthy one that spans centuries and countries. I focus on
Luban’s discussion because it is so thorough. I do not mean to suggest,
however, that his is the only voice in the conversation advocating for a
theory of lawyering that addresses the common conflict between lawyer obligations of zealousness, partisanship, and even confidentiality
on the one hand, and moral obligations to third parties and the community at large on the other.15
Luban argues that the three principles mentioned above, which
have formed the dominant picture of lawyers’ ethics, are not supporta13

Id. at xvii.
Id. at xix–xx.
15
In fact, the discussion of a lawyer’s moral obligations conflicting with her
other duties has been ongoing and the number of voices in the conversation is quite
expansive. For further discussion of these topics, see generally Katherine R. Kruse,
Lawyers, Justice and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. REV. 389
(2005) (discussing a lawyer’s obligations when she morally disagrees with her client’s actions); Russell G. Pearce, Model Rule 1.0: Lawyers are Morally Accountable,
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1805 (2002) (advocating a shift from amorality to moral responsibility while maintaining zealous advocacy); Elliot D. Cohen, Pure Legal Advocates and Moral Agents Revisited: A Reply to Memory and Rose, 21 CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS 39 (2002) (arguing that lawyers’ roles of pure legal advocate and moral agent
inherently conflict); Kay Wheat, Lawyers, Confidentiality and Public and Private
Interests, 1 LEGAL ETHICS 184 (1998) (discussing lawyers’ duty of confidentiality
and its repercussions to the community-at-large).
14
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ble outside the context of criminal defense and must therefore be replaced by a different theory of lawyer ethics: “moral activism.”16 As
he defines it, the morally activist lawyer shares and aims to share moral responsibility for the ends that she is promoting in her representation and the means used to promote those ends along with her client.17
In short,
[T]he morally activist lawyer will challenge her
client if the representation seems to her morally
unworthy; she may cajole or negotiate with the
client to change the ends or means; she may
find herself compelled to initiate action that the
client will view as betrayal; and she will not
fear to quit. She will have none of the principle
of non-accountability, and she sees severe limitations on what partisanship permits.18
Of course not all ethicists agree with Luban. Stephen Pepper
famously argued that the lawyers’ role is amoral and that this amorality is ethical.19 In doing so, he elevates client autonomy as a primary
societal value and suggests that what lawyers do is facilitate and even
increase client autonomy. Therefore, pursuing the client’s legal objectives, without judgment, is in itself a moral good. Lawyering, as he
states, is a means to “first class citizenship, to meaningful autonomy,
for the client.”20 Compellingly, at first blush, he addresses the inequality of access problem as a concern, but not one that requires extraordinary behavior on the part of lawyers. On the contrary, Pepper
suggests that, “transforming the amoral facilitator role of the lawyer
into the judge/facilitator role . . . would compound inequality upon inequality—first the inequality of access to a lawyer, then the inequality
of what law that particular lawyer will allow the client access to.”21
There are several problems with this argument, however. First,
Luban is not suggesting that the amoral facilitator role should be transformed into the judge/facilitator role. That Luban advocates lawyers’
16

LUBAN, supra note 9, at xxii.
Id.
18
Id.
19
Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 615–19 (1986).
20
Id. at 617.
21
Id. at 620.
17
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use of moral judgment does not mean that he is advocating a transformation from lawyer to judge. It means simply that lawyers’ moral
judgment must not be suspended in the name of effective lawyering.
Lawyers sharing their moral judgments with their clients is not the
same as “sitting in judgment” in the sense that Pepper seems to mean.
Second, the argument that the transformation suggested by
Pepper would compound inequality is puzzling. Whether lawyers act
more like judges has no bearing on whether their services are available
to those who cannot afford them. While it is possible to see a judgefacilitator as limiting the type of legal services provided to one who
has access, it does nothing to provide greater access to those who don’t
have that access in the first place.
Finally, as Luban suggests, Pepper’s recognition of the notion
of first-class citizenship, a citizenship using lawyers’ assistance to take
advantage of all that the law has to offer, undercuts his argument that
the moral good of the increased autonomy the amoral lawyer creates
outweighs any moral bad from the unequal distribution of access to the
law.22 As is discussed in greater detail below,23 first-class citizenship
implies that there are those with second-class citizenship. In other
words, those who do not have access to lawyers do not enjoy all that
the law has to offer. This result means that the amoral lawyer of Pepper’s description is one who is complicit in facilitating an inequality
before the law. This moral bad is not outweighed by the moral good of
facilitating autonomy in our society.
Later authors, and there are almost as many as there are authors
who came before Luban, have grappled with the notion of lawyer role
and ethics. David Thunder, for example, discusses Pepper’s argument
in, “Can a Good Person be a Lawyer?”24 Thunder is concerned about
the implications of Pepper’s conception, which “places ethical blinders
on the lawyer so restrictive that he loses the right and indeed the duty
to take at least some responsibility for the social and moral purposes to
which his services are put.”25 Thunder finds that Pepper’s main flaw is
in his “implausibly demanding view of autonomy.”26 This finding is
22

See LUBAN, supra note 9, at 167–68.
See infra pp. 10–11.
24
See generally David Thunder, Can a Good Person be a Lawyer?, 20 NOTRE
DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 313 (2006).
25
Id. at 316 (emphasis in original).
26
Id. at 317.
23
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similar to Luban’s own response to Pepper and suggests that the value
of autonomy, although concededly important, is not often more valuable than other, stronger moral considerations.
Whether or not one is compelled by the theory of moral activism, it is clear that the standard conception of lawyering, including the
principles of non-accountability (Pepper’s amoral lawyer) and partisanship, has been troubling to the public, to lawyers, and to legal ethicists for some time. Moral activism offers a chance to ameliorate, if
not completely resolve, what is traditionally viewed as a conflict between professional duty and common morality. Teaching this theory to
future lawyers, therefore, offers the tantalizing possibility of improving lawyering and, consequently, our justice system.27
However, as Luban goes on to write about in the second half of
his book, moral activism as simply a theory for one-to-one representa27

Luban has a wonderful quote from Abraham Lincoln that he provides as an
example of his conclusion in defense of the theory of moral activism that “nothing
permits a lawyer to discard her discretion or relieves her of the necessity of asking
whether a client’s project is worthy of a decent person’s service.” See LUBAN, supra
note 9, at 174. Lincoln is quoted as having said to a client:
Yes, we can doubtless gain your case for you; we can set
a whole neighborhood at loggerheads; we can distress a
widowed mother and her six fatherless children and
thereby get you six hundred dollars to which you seem to
have a legal claim, but which rightfully belongs, it appears to me, as much to the woman and her children as it
does to you. You must remember that some things legally
right are not morally right. We shall not take your case,
but will give you a little advice for which we will charge
you nothing. You seem to be a sprightly, energetic man;
we would advise you to try your hand at making six hundred dollars in some other way.
Id. As Luban notes, “Lincoln freed the slaves; this may not be unconnected to
the fact that in his practice of law he was himself no slave, not even to trade idioms
that he surely thought were moral idioms as well.” Id.
While this example is, to be sure, inspiring, it is also more difficult than it
appears to emulate. It is rare that moral dilemmas that give rise to this sort of ethical
dilemma are easy to address. In fact, as is true with any talented person who does
something well, it is likely that even Lincoln did not behave this way easily despite
our perceptions of how easy, graceful, and eminently obvious his words may appear
to us now. Imagine, therefore, having the opportunity to try to teach all lawyers how
to apply this level of integrity to their daily practice within the context of live client
dilemmas, as diverse and as numerous as those encountered in a six or nine-semester
rotation!
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tion is not sufficient.28 Moral activism is also a theory that permits
lawyers to more clearly connect their training and professional endeavors to larger issues of justice. It is akin, suggests Luban, to Justice
Brandeis’s conception of the “opportunity in the law.”29 Brandeis saw
that law provided an opportunity to balance and neutralize powerful
private interests, which was a necessity for democracy. The morally
activist lawyer, concerned as she is about the common morality that
underlies democratic principles is committed, as was Brandeis, to the
necessity of the “people’s lawyer.” The “people’s lawyer” is the lawyer that provides this balance.30
In this respect, moral activism offers a theory that supports
lawyer responsibility for addressing the access to justice issue. Here, I
am not suggesting that morally activist lawyers will all become “people’s lawyers.” Rather, I am suggesting that the responsibility for ensuring the political will (and the financial support that is a necessary
corollary) for addressing the access to justice issue is the responsibility
of all lawyers.
There is support for this proposition in the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model Rules, which speak of lawyers “having special
responsibility for the quality of justice.”31 What, precisely, does responsibility for the “quality of justice” mean? Presumably, it incorporates notions of fundamental fairness—for the quality of justice that is
unfair would seem to be quite obviously poor—but that begs the question, what is fair? Arguably, what is fair is a process or procedure that
treats all users of that process or procedure equally. This does not
mean that all users are, in fact, equal. They may not be equal to one
another in talents, looks, industriousness, or many other measures.
However, our definition of fair government makes clear that they are
each treated as equals before the law, regardless of their differences.32

28

See LUBAN, supra note 9, at 237–39.
Id. at xxiii.
30
Id. at 171–72. Luban credits Brandeis’s discussion of the “people’s lawyer”
as being very close to the “progressive correction of classical liberalism—the private
sector in an industrial democracy raises political threats comparable to those that
democratic government faced in its confrontations with the various anciens régimes.” Id.
31
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble & Scope (2012).
32
LUBAN, supra note 9, at 253.
29
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Luban analyzes the United States Supreme Court building’s
famous promise of “Equal Justice Under Law” in order to determine
whether it is actually a right.33 He asks the question, is equal justice
under law “part of our structure of political legitimacy?”34 Citing several historical examples, including the right of women to sue in court
before they had the right to vote, the Civil War amendments that made
African Americans citizens and “allowed them access to American
courts,” and Supreme Court decisions that allowed non-citizens access
to American courts, Luban argues that “equality-of-rights-not-fortunes
has always been a common denominator of American political life.”35
The question then becomes whether equality of rights implies
equality of legal rights. As Luban explains, early American writers
were most likely thinking about moral rights, “or (more likely) rights
given by God in natural law.”36 Therefore, in order to read equality of
legal rights as implicit in the concept of equality of rights, it is necessary to view legal rights as connected to moral rights. As Luban states,
“. . . [I]f the court system claimed that its activities have nothing much
to do with respecting moral rights we would view it as seriously defective.”37
However, he goes on to state that the right to legal services is
not a moral one, but rather, a political one.38 In this respect, it is not
similar to claiming rights to food, shelter, clothing or other kinds of
“welfare rights;” instead, it “derives implicitly from the nature of political legitimacy.”39 Additionally, the derivation is relative to our particular system of government, so, again, unlike welfare rights that are
more closely tied to a moral conception of human dignity, equality of
legal rights only exists as a legitimation principle of our particular society:
Legitimation rights are claims to goods that
form presuppositions of a people’s common political life; when these rights are denied, the expectation that the affronted parties should con33

See id. at 252–53.
Id. at 252.
35
Id. at 253.
36
Id. at 254.
37
Id.
38
LUBAN, supra note 9, at 265.
39
Id.
34
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tinue to respect the political system—in other
words, the expectation that they should continue
to treat it as a legitimate political system—has
no basis.40
Thus, “absent equal access to the legal system . . . our system
violates the principle of consistency and its own legitimation principles.”41 Quoting Locke, Luban concludes his argument in support of
his contention that access to legal services for all is necessary to our
democracy.42 Without it, there is in an implied right to resist, which
can and should lead to revolution and war: “. . . [A]n illegitimate system generates a right of resistance: for resistance is the ultimate sanction when a political system undermines the premises of its own claim
to govern a common life.” 43
Underscoring Luban’s point is his response to Pepper’s argument about first-class citizenship. As Luban points out, Pepper’s conception of the amoral lawyer as a facilitator of first-class citizenship is
a comparative one:
[T]he components of first-class citizenship allow you to leverage yourself into a better position (economic or otherwise) than those who
don’t have them. The resulting competitive advantage in turn give[s] you further leverage to
augment your position still more . . . . Finally,
your augmented position will get you the influence and power to push for rule changes that
further enhance the packet of perks accruing to
first-class citizens.
In this way, the differential granting of firstclass citizens yields a self-producing vicious
spiral of social inequality and outright damage
to those who don’t have it. The problem is that
when first-class citizenship is not universally

40

Id. at 266.
Id. at 255.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 266.
41
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available, its components are not mere benefits;
they are advantages.44
It is therefore incumbent on the lawyer, as facilitator of this vicious cycle of power and damage infliction, to prevent this. The prevention does not occur by refusing to represent a corporation or even
by imposition of lawyers’ own moral values, but rather by ensuring a
necessary balance and moral restraint through legal services access for
all. Stated another way, access to justice, or lack of access, changes the
very nature of what access confers on the represented. In a system
where all have equal rights of access, the role of lawyers could be conceived as facilitators of citizenship benefits for all. Where, however,
access to justice is unequal, the role of lawyers becomes facilitators of
first-class citizenship for those with access, and, by implication, purveyors of second-class citizenship to those without. Simply by the act
of representing parties in a system where others cannot obtain this representation, lawyers become complicit in the systematic and ongoing
disadvantaging of those who are unable to obtain representation.
Further, as Luban points out, lawyers cannot disclaim responsibility for these unfortunate consequences of unequal access by asserting that legal services access is simply a fault of the economic system and not of the legal system.45 This argument is based on the
premise “that the state has not blocked poor people from having meaningful access to the legal system.”46 This premise is false because examples of governmental “blockages” of poor people from the legal
system are numerous: 1) the complexity of regulation that necessitates
legal intervention; 2) the fee structures regulated by the ABA Code
and the Model Rules and enforced by the highest court in each state; 3)
the court-appointed lawyer system, which is governed by state and
federal court decisions and state and federal legislative budgetary decisions; and 4) the unauthorized practice of law regulations that prevent
anyone other than lawyers from representing indigents in most legal
contexts are just a few examples.47 While it could be argued that the
solution is to have less complicated laws and a greater ability for nonlawyers to provide representation, these solutions themselves would
44

David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper,
11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 644 (1986) (emphasis in original).
45
LUBAN, supra note 9, at 246.
46
Id.
47
Id.
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not solve the entire access problem and would create significant other
problems.48
It is clear that “the selective exclusion of the poor from the legal system does not simply fail to confer an advantage on them—it actively injures them.”49 Most compellingly Luban concludes,
For a legal system does more than protect people from each other: it enormously expands our
field of action, allowing us to do things that we
couldn’t have done otherwise—to draft wills,
adopt children, make contracts, limit liability.
As people utilize these features of the system, a
network of practices—of power and privilege—
48

Note, for example, the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Turner v. Rogers, which involved the appeal of a child support defendant who was
unrepresented by counsel. 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2512 (2011). The Court was unwilling to
remedy the lack of representation issue through the appointment of counsel. Id.
However, it clearly recognized the danger faced by the appellant in a forum that had
been designed to be less formal in a misguided effort to respond to the numbers of
litigants in that forum (child support) who were unable to obtain the assistance of
counsel. See id. The Court suggests that due process requires, at a minimum, “alternative procedures” in which inter alia the trial court judge informs an unrepresented
party of the critical issue and make a specific finding regarding that issue prior to
making a ruling. Id. at 2519–20. These “alternative procedures” seem very like,
however, the everyday procedures in a court of law whose procedures have not been
significantly reduced in an effort to simplify the law.
Additionally, even where there are quite competent non-legal representatives, they are not equal to qualified legal representatives who represent the opposing
party in a typical David and Goliath matter. In my experience, foreclosure matters
illustrate this quite well. Philadelphia, in an effort to stem the alarming rise of foreclosures after the 2008 market crash, created an interim settlement procedure meant
to provide unrepresented homeowners the opportunity to try to resolve their loan defaults with a loan modification. Federal and state funding allowed for an enormous
expansion in the number of housing counselors—non-lawyers—who were trained
and available to assist homeowners in default through this process. Despite the excellent service they generally provided, in most cases, if there was no lawyer for the
homeowner, no loan re-structuring occurred. When pro bono lawyers or legal services lawyers ultimately intervened, pointing out or actually filing counterclaims to
the foreclosure action, the re-structured loan that was originally proposed by the
housing counselor suddenly became acceptable to the bank. When a knowledgeable
housing counselor was able to identify and discuss these same issues with the bank,
however, there was little responsiveness on the part of the bank because it was well
aware that a homeowner, even with the housing counselor’s guidance, was unlikely
to actually file any paperwork pro se.
49
LUBAN, supra note 9, at 247.
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is set up from which those who have no access
to the system are excluded; and this exclusion
itself intensifies the pariah status of the poor. It
is hard to avoid the conclusion that the state has
conferred the advantages of the legal system on
those who can afford to use it and built it on the
backs of those who cannot. The state has not
been an innocent bystander observing the regrettable spectacle of economic inequality and
poverty: it shares primary responsibility with
the legal profession (and its well-off clients) for
the fact that the poor have no meaningful access
to justice and are made worse off by that fact.50
Thus, while even the morally activist lawyer contributes to justice in providing ethical representation to her private sector client, the
systemic exclusion of the poor from the legal system perpetuates disparities in power that undermine the legitimacy of the legal system as a
whole. For these reasons, the morally activist lawyer, regardless of the
identity of her clients, must also have as a central professional concern
the plight of those who cannot afford representation.
So, what does this have to do with legal education? First, if
regularly taught and employed, Luban’s moral activism would result in
more ethical lawyering. Second, if the pedagogy used to teach moral
activism is experiential, and I will defend this as the best choice for
rounding out ethical teaching below,51 then the effort to ensure that all
lawyers receive experiential education can provide an opportunity for
doing so through the provision of legal services to the indigent, significantly and positively impacting the access to justice issue.
A. Applying Morally Activist Principles: “The Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reasoning”
One way to explore whether teaching moral activism could actually make a difference in ensuring more effective ethical lawyering
is to examine historical examples of lawyering where we would agree
that there were ethical lapses and try to determine whether the employment of moral activist principles by the lawyers involved might
50
51

Id. at 247–48.
See infra Part II.
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have resulted in a different outcome. The Watergate and Enron scandals and the recent economic crisis are three examples that come immediately to mind and will be explored more fully below.
Preliminarily, it must be noted that, I recognize that the following analysis is an oversimplification of the deliberative process suggested by Luban as well as an overly formulaic application of a concept applied to situations that were more complex than suggested.
Nevertheless, I believe that the analysis shows that if the theories posited by Luban were taught regularly and just as regularly discussed and
deliberatively applied in a clinical setting to real world ethical problems, a kind of morally deliberative habit could be developed that
could change the way lawyers operate for the better. Below, therefore,
is Luban’s theory and my own analysis of how application of that theory might have provided the lawyers involved with at least a branch to
reach for as they floundered in the rapid and roiling currents of their
practices.
Having concluded that common morality must be considered
even when it is in conflict with “role morality,” that is one’s own understanding of one’s professional obligations, Luban develops and explains a “structure of justification” that can also be used as a “structure
of deliberation” to determine how to respond to the conflict: “The
Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reasoning.”52 Essentially, lawyers facing
such a conflict should consider the justification, as demonstrated by its
moral goodness, of the institution requiring the specific role obligation—the adversary system.53 Next, lawyers should consider the justification of the role as demonstrated by the institution.54 Third, lawyers
should consider the justification for the role obligation by demonstrating its essentialness to the role.55 Finally, lawyers should consider the
role act being contemplated by demonstrating that the role obligations
require that act.56
In an effort to create a more deliberative structure that incorporates this reasoning, Luban suggests the following seven-step process:

52

LUBAN, supra note 9, at 105, 140–41.
Id. at 128–32.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
53
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1) Identify “the institution, the role, the role obligation and the role act.”
2) Assess “the institution, role and role obligation in the light of the ends they are to serve.”
3) Apply “the minimum-threshold test: determining whether, at each link” (in The Fourfold
Root of Sufficient Reasoning), “the credits and
debits indicate that the entity (institution, role,
role obligation, role act) is justified;”
4) Apply “the cumulative-weight test: determining the total significance of the various policy
arguments to the role act;”
5) Assess “the relevance of the policy arguments to the case at hand;”
6) Resolve “the dilemma by weighing the justification of the role act against the moral offense
of performing it;”
7) Act.57
So, we turn first to our example of the ethical lapses of the Watergate lawyers. What could we predict the outcome might have been
if they had engaged in this exercise? In step one, of course, the institution is the adversary system, the role is advocate, the role obligation is
zeal or loyalty, and the act their client, the White House, requested was
orchestrating an illegal break-in of their opposing party’s headquarters
in order to find information that could be used against their adversary.58
The assessment in step two does not speak of the role act,
merely of the preceding three entities. We already know, from both the
standard conception of lawyer roles and the morally activist concep57

Id. at 140. Note that Luban himself admits that this lengthy deliberative process might seem too much to ask. LUBAN, supra note 9, at 140. Further, he explicitly
states that it is a “theoretical account of moral justification, not a recipe for real-time
deliberation.” Id. Nevertheless, he goes on to state that it is still a valuable tool for an
analysis of the rules of professional obligation. Id. This is how I apply it to the specific examples and, in so doing, hope to show how teaching this theory can be applied to live client dilemmas in order to teach the habit of ethical dilemma identification and problem-solving. Ultimately, as I will argue, it is teaching this habit that is
paramount to shoring up lawyer ethical behavior.
58
Mark Curriden, The Lawyers of Watergate, 98 A.B.A. J., June 2012, at 36,
38–40.
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tion, that the three entities: the adversary system, the role of advocate,
and the duty of zeal are justified. In step three, however, we encounter
a problem. As we apply the minimum threshold test to each entity, we
see that the final entity—the role act requested by the client—is not
minimally justified. It is not even necessary to continue with the seven-step process of deliberation. Had the Watergate lawyers used this
deliberative process, or something similar, they might have seen that
their role obligations, as justified by their roles and the institution itself, were not sufficiently strong to overcome the lack of justification
for the role act their client requested.
While the very fact that the role act requested was illegal may
seem to render an ethical deliberative process about it absurd, listening
to the reflections of two of the lawyers at the heart of the scandal is
very telling. Attorney Egil Krogh, Jr., Deputy Assistant to President
Nixon at the time of the Watergate scandal commented,
In law school, I took this curious course on ethics . . . . But there was nothing about conflicts
or the role of lawyers. We were in completely
unknown territory. I was completely unprepared. My loyalty to Richard Nixon was personal and total. And I had extraordinary loyalty
to [assistant to the president for domestic affairs
and formerly licensed attorney] John
Erlichman.59
Former White House Council John Dean, in reflecting on the
Watergate scandal and his involvement stated, “If Bud and I had been
able to sit down with each other back then at the White House, and we
had been able to share our concerns, everything might have turned out
60
differently.”
These comments beg the question, what prevented them from
sitting down and sharing their concerns? In hindsight, the reality is not
that they were unaware that the requested act was wrong. It was that
their interpretation of their role duties of loyalty and zealous advocacy
obscured the conflict between their professional role (as they saw it)
and their personal role as a good citizen. Their habit was to resolve all
59
60

Id. at 40.
Id. at 64.
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conflicts and potential conflicts in favor of the client, which ultimately
led them to be blind to any conflicts. Teaching Luban’s Fourfold Root
of Sufficient Reasoning and applying it repeatedly over the course of
several rotations can help lawyers identify dilemmas regularly and aid
in their ability to solve them.
Perhaps it can fairly be argued that Watergate is a poor example of an obvious ethical failure since the role act requested by the client was not merely immoral but also illegal. We turn, then, to the
scandal of the late 1990s involving Enron. Here, the lawyers’ actions
were much more complex. The role acts requested by the corporate
client were, essentially, to keep confidential any accounting irregularities so that shareholders and government regulators were misled about
Enron’s assets and liabilities.61 Embedded in this request was also a
request to certify as legal, and therefore permissible, various “loans”
that were reported as “sales.”62
However, at the time that the liability information was being
withheld and the manager-created “sales” were being reported, it was
not entirely clear that doing so was immoral, illegal, and ultimately destructive of the client. There were many factors that contributed to this
confusion.
First, Enron had followed the pattern of many corporations in
phasing out the traditional manner of using one law firm or set of inhouse lawyers to provide legal counseling and representation. Instead,
they parceled out their work, spreading it amongst several law firms so
that each individual law firm only had part of the picture about Enron’s activities, proposals, and financial status.63
61

See Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1185–87 (2003).
62
See id. at 1185–86. This summary of events is clearly a gross oversimplification of what occurred. However, irrespective of the more complex details, application of Luban’s moral theory to it is still meaningful to the question of how things
could have come out differently had the lawyers involved been provided with a great
deal more ethical training.
63
In his article, “A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor after
Enron,” Robert Gordon examines this particular phenomenon in great detail. See
generally id. As he describes it,
Big companies used to have a single outside law firm on
which they would rely for most of their legal advice. . . .
At its best . . . the system allowed lawyers to learn the
business they were advising and, since they were not
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Second, many managers discouraged the lawyers with whom
they were consulting to investigate beyond the confines of the information provided them.64 Presumably they did so in a manner that
seemed at the time to be a little constraining but not directly obstructionist as it later turned out to be. The lawyers therefore were misled
into believing that the information that was kept from them wasn’t all
that relevant to their decision-making and therefore, upon meeting resistance from the managers, they didn’t probe.65
Third, the lawyers ultimately became confused as to who their
client was. They relied too heavily on the assumption that high-level
managers with whom they interacted had the best interests of their
corporate client at heart, or, assuming that such managers were actually their clients, didn’t question manager behavior.66 Had they been
more objective, the managers’ behavior might have raised flags that
would have prompted further probing.67

easily replaced, to give independent and critical advice. . .
. [I]n recent years . . . [t]here [has been] no entity inside
or outside the organization with the overall knowledge
and prestige to give independent advice.
Id. at 1202 (internal citations omitted).
This phenomenon, specifically as it applies to what happened with the Enron crisis, lends plausibility to the lawyers’ claim that they didn’t really know or understand the Enron managers’ proposals sufficiently to be able to give valid counsel.
As Gordon writes, “. . . Enron never trusted any one set of lawyers with extensive
information about its operations—it spread legal work out to over 100 law firms. . . .
It is this layering of authority, fragmentation of responsibility, and decentralization
that has made it possible for the chairman, CEO and board of directors of Enron, as
well as the lawyers, to claim that they did not know much about what was going on
in their own company.” Id. at 1193–94.
Neal Batson, the court-appointed examiner of the Enron bankruptcy notes in
his Final Report that “Enron employed over 250 in-house attorneys and retained
hundreds of law firms.” Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner at
48, In re Enron Corp., (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2003) (No. 01-16034) [hereinafter
“Batson Report”].
64
Gordon, supra note 61, at 1203.
65
There is some controversy about whether the misleading was intentional or
merely the unintended consequence of managers trying to get results quickly and efficiently. Either way, however, the message received by the lawyers was that they
didn’t need to probe; they just needed to perform.
66
“One explanation for the attorneys’ failure may be that they lost sight of the
fact that the corporation was their client. It appears that some of these attorneys considered the officers to be their clients when, in fact, the attorneys owed duties to Enron.” Batson Report, supra note 63, at 115.
67
Id. at 114–15.
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There are more cynical explanations for the lawyers’ failures,
of course, involving their own greed and consequent willingness to
keep Enron’s business at almost any costs.68 Acknowledging this argument, however, fails to erase the very real role conflict issues that
this corporate representation raised for the individual lawyers involved.
There are also those that would argue that there was no lawyer
failure; instead, the Enron lawyers simply engaged in their duties of
confidentiality and zealous representation.69 Some suggest the real
culprits are the directors of Enron, who were, to varying degrees, provided with evidence that the transactions were risky and fraught with
conflict of interest problems but failed to act.70 With the benefit of
hindsight, there is little doubt that there were multiple culprits in the
Enron debacle. Whether the lawyers are less to blame than the directors or the intentionally fraudulent Enron managers does not change
the need, as lawyers and educators of lawyers, to analyze what occurred and suggest that there was room for the lawyers to improve
their effectiveness, at a minimum.
Analyzing the role acts that the Enron lawyers were asked to
engage in repeatedly, we can see two distinct patterns: 1) maintaining
client confidences and 2) providing advice regarding the legality of
various client-proposed transactions. The role conflict occurred in addressing the context of both of these fairly quotidian lawyer acts. In
the first instance, Enron sought legal assistance in avoiding disclosure
of certain facts that ordinarily would have been required to be provided to the Board of Directors, Enron’s shareholders, and various government agencies. Given that the default was to report, a lawyer asked
to withhold information should immediately be concerned about
whether doing so would run afoul of existing legal obligations and
therefore trigger the deliberative process necessary to determine
whether the requested role act is justified and therefore performable.71

68

See Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1109–11 (2003) (detailing numerous wrongdoings by Enron’s main law firm and tying their revenues to the success of
Enron, their largest client).
69
See Gordon, supra note 61, at 1194 (laying out a similar defense as the
“classic defense for the corporate lawyer’s role”).
70
Fisch & Rosen, supra note 68, at 1118–19.
71
Batson Report, supra note 63, at 28.
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Doing so now, we can see that the role act of confidentiality
could have been justified (along with the adversary system and the
lawyer role) as meeting the minimum-threshold test as required by step
It should be noted here that some believe that whether it is minimally obligatory to raise questions about specific client requests is, in the first instance, resolved
by how the role is defined. So, for example, if a lawyer sees herself as an independent advisor and/or takes on the role of gatekeeper, then clearly lots of questions
should be asked prior to approving a particular client proposal. If, however, the lawyer sees herself simply as the client’s advocate, the lawyer’s role is to find a way to
approve the client’s proposed schemes. Luban, Gordon, Fisch and Rosen all agree
that the distinction between these roles changes the moral calculus. Luban and Gordon, however, argue that the pure advocate role is inappropriate in the civil corporate
representation context. See LUBAN, supra note 9, at 11–18; Gordon, supra note 61, at
1204–06. On the other hand, Fisch and Rosen argue that, while not inappropriate, it
does cause ethical issues that could be best addressed by increasing and improving
corporate regulation rather than lawyer regulation. See Fisch & Rosen, supra note
68, at 1102–04, 1131. For purposes of our discussion I do not believe that the distinctions in lawyer role matter.
A pure advocate who “merely” finds a way to do what his client wants,
without regard to the implications of the client’s proposals is arguably as ineffective
as the gatekeeper who fails to investigate. Enron is the perfect example of this ineffectiveness. The lawyers’ zealous defense of the managers’ proposals ultimately contributed to their client’s collapse. The problem, then, was not the differing perspective on role but the lawyers’ failure to understand who their client was and to engage
in the appropriate probing of facts that would have protected their client. The larger
point, however, is that, even if the managers and not the corporation had been their
clients, effective advocacy (not just effective advising) requires probing. An effective advocate, who, after appropriate research and investigation, discovers that a client’s proposed scheme isn’t workable, can work with the client to determine a workable way to meet her client’s goals. The ineffective advocate, just like the ineffective
advisor, exposes her client to potential liability. The question for legal educators,
therefore, is how can we teach lawyers to probe sufficiently, regardless of their role,
so that advice and representation are comporting with ethical and community moral
standards at all times.
As Professor Steven Schwarcz specifically recommends, in his analysis of
the financial crisis of 2008, educators must take more time to ensure that lawyers are
taught: “to be aware that client actions can cause harmful consequences that may not
be immediately obvious,” “why market participants do not always see or appreciate
the potential that their actions will cause harm,” and that “complexity exacerbates
these concerns. It can undermine disclosure’s adequacy. It can also tempt individuals
to make oversimplifications, to overrely on heuristics such as agency ratings and
mathematical risk models.” Lawyers should also be taught, “to recognize that business people often have higher risk tolerances, as well as different, legitimate, pressures (e.g., budgets), that tend to influence their decisions.” Finally, lawyers should
be taught “to better understand the core principles of corporate law and finance,
thereby broadening their perspectives and enabling them to better identify and assess
consequences.” Steven L. Schwarcz, The Role of Lawyers in the Global Financial
Crisis, 24 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 214, 225–26 (2010) (citations omitted).
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three. In step four, the total significance of the various policy arguments weighing in favor of client confidentiality can be assessed as
high. Further, the relevance of the policy arguments to the case at hand
is also high, as presumably the duty of confidentiality in this case contributed a great deal to Enron managers’ willingness to share their
schemes with their lawyers to the extent that they actually did so.72
However, when we move to resolving the dilemma by weighing the
justification of the role act against the moral offense of performing it,
we see that once again, the justification of role act fails.
Enron was a multi-billion dollar corporation. It employed thousands of people and shareholders had invested billions of dollars in it.
It had outstanding contractual obligations around the world.73 The
lawyers knew or should have known the policies behind the various
disclosure and reporting requirements from which Enron was seeking
to escape. Certainly, nothing should prevent a lawyer from investigating whether a particular regulatory requirement as applied to her client
is somehow unfairly onerous and therefore challengeable. But, as Gordon states, this is a far cry from being, “free to ignore, subvert, or nullify the laws because the value [the corporation] contributes to society
justifies its obeying the higher-law imperatives of profit-seeking and
shareholder-wealth-creation.”74 Justification for disobeying regulatory
requirements and fiduciary duty simply because the managers sought
to further their wealth-maximizing schemes was precisely what the
lawyers were being asked to do. Engaging in the weighing process required by step six of the The Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reasoning
enables the lawyer to see this fact and clarifies the stakes of the consequences of the task that the Enron lawyers were asked to perform.

72

As discussed above, Gordon revealed that in fact the managers disclosed
very little to the professionals involved or left their lawyers’ questions unanswered.
Gordon, supra note 61, at 1203. This, of course, undercuts the broad traditional justification for confidentiality. Arguably, therefore, simply on the grounds that the managers were NOT revealing confidences but instead were discouraging the few lawyer
attempts to get information, the lawyers should have and would have been justified
in disclosing information or at least warning the managers that they could not provide the necessary legal counsel without further information.
73
See Kurt Eichenwald & Diana B. Henriques, Enron’s Many Strands: The
Company Unravels; Enron Buffed Image to a Shine Even as it Rotted from Within,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/10/business/enron-smany-strands-company-unravels-enron-buffed-image-shine-even-itrotted.html?pagewanted=1
74
Gordon, supra note 61, at 1199.
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Keeping confidences, instead of working with executives to
disclose and correct their schemes, resulted in the loss of thousands of
jobs, millions of dollars, ultimately the destruction of the client and,
perhaps even more critically, faith in the justice system. 75 If, as many
stated in the aftermath, such corrupt and damaging behavior could be
perpetuated and kept secret in the name of the adversary system,76 then
something was very broken with that system.
The second role act of the Enron lawyers was providing advice
regarding the legality of various proposed transactions. As with confidentiality, this particular role act is wholly consistent with all conceptions of lawyering. So, what went wrong? The trigger for the deliberative test that could have, if engaged in, prevented numerous harms was
not the request for advice itself, but rather the manner in which that request was asked to be executed.
The Batson Report declares that several Enron attorneys violated their ethical obligations because they failed to adequately investigate the facts underlying the proposed transactions.77 One of many examples illustrates the problem clearly. The law firm of Vinson &
Elkins was reportedly Enron’s primary outside law firm.78 Enron allegedly sought “true sale opinions” regarding some of their transactions in order to be able to list gains rather than losses on their disclosure forms.79 According to the Batson Report, Enron sought such an
opinion regarding a particular transaction with Sundance Industrial,
even though the lawyers had no information that there was a “valid
business purpose” for the “sale,” which is an essential component of a
“true sale.”80
Turning to our seven deliberative steps, then, as with the confidentiality issue discussed above, we can move easily through the first
five steps. However, at the sixth step, weighing the justification—
75

Julie Appleby, Many Who Lost Savings, Jobs Pleased, USA TODAY (May.
25, 2006, 10:07 AM).
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/2006-05-25-enronworkers-usat_x.htm.
76
See, e.g., Fisch & Rosen, supra note 68, at 1109.
77
See Batson Report, supra note 63, at 48–55.
78
Id. at 48.
79
See id. at 49 (stating that Vinson & Elkins delivered a true sale opinion to
Enron while representing them).
80
Id.
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willful ignorance of the zealous advocate—against the moral offense—
misleading the public regarding the strength and legality of a particular
transaction—leads to the unmistakable conclusion that the role act is
not justified. This is particularly true where, as here, that willful ignorance leads to an act that actually harms one’s client. Finally, as Gordon points out, the willful ignorance of the zealous advocate is not justified in the non-adversarial context of advice-giving.81
One further note on the importance of teaching moral activism
both theoretically and in practice is recognition of the true meaning of
simply discussing a code of ethics, federal or state, without regard to
moral doctrine. As Thomas Bost pointed out, in reflecting on the Enron collapse, “[T]he Code makes fewer moral claims . . . today than in
the past.”82 Citing Mary Ann Glendon’s historical analysis of the
changes in the canons of ethics adopted by the ABA, Bost notes that in
1908 the Canon suggested that effective lawyers should “impress on
the client . . . exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral
law.”83 Today, however, the “ABA Model Rules, no doubt reflecting
the current diminished ‘consensus on what is right and wrong for lawyers,’ contain no comparable moral imperative.”84
This lack of emphasis on morality, importantly, should not be
mistaken for “value-neutral” teaching. Citing the work of Deborah
Rhode and Paul Paton, Bost points out that extracting morality from
81

Gordon, supra note 61, at 1205 (“The advocacy ideology regularly and persistently confuses the managers, who ask for lawyers’ advice, with the lawyers’ actual client, the corporate entity.”).
After a detailed analysis of the distinction between the criminal defense lawyer’s role and the corporate attorney’s role, Gordon concludes that there is actually a
common factor between the two and that is that both roles involve a public aspect.
Id. at 1204–07. “The real lesson from the defense lawyer’s or advocate’s role is
simply that the lawyer is, in addition to being a private agent of his clients, a public
agent of the legal system, whose job is to help clients steer their way through the
maze of the law, to bring clients’ conduct and behavior into conformity with the
law—to get the client as much as possible of what the client wants without damaging
the framework of the law. He may not act in furtherance of his client’s interest in
ways that ultimately frustrate, sabotage, or nullify the public purposes of the laws.”
Id. at 1207.
82
Thomas G. Bost, The Lawyer as Truth-Teller: Lessons from Enron, 32 PEPP.
L. REV. 505, 514–15 (2005).
83
Id. at 515 (emphasis added by Bost) (citing MARY ANN GLENDON, A
NATION UNDER LAWYERS 80 (1994) (quoting CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Cannon 32
(1908))).
84
Id. (quoting GLENDON, supra note 83, at 79).
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the curriculum sends an “unmistakable message” that “conformity to
the Code” is what is expected—and nothing more.85 While Bost ultimately falls short of advocating for broad-based moral teaching, he
concludes his article with a call to Christian lawyers to understand
how their religious teachings should inform their own kind of morally
activist approach.86
While I recognize, as Bost does, that it is quite challenging to
reach consensus on moral and ethical values, I reject the notion that
this failure of consensus should permit the elimination of explicit discussions of moral values unless the discussion is amongst a closed
group with presumed shared moral values. In fact, it is precisely because of the diversity of moral and ethical viewpoints that exist in a
pluralistic society such as ours, that values-based discussions, allowing
for diverse viewpoints, should become a mainstay of legal ethics
teachings. Further, as I argue, there is no better way to ensure that
there are myriad opportunities to see this diversity of moral and ethical
viewpoints and struggle with how to act consistently as both a moral
being—however that is defined—and a lawyer than in the course of the
representation of multiple, culturally and economically diverse clients
in a variety of different substantive contexts. Beyond the details of
lawyer role in the Enron collapse, and how an application of the deliberative process developed by Luban might have created a different and
better result, a broader lesson from Enron is how the failure to include
discussions of morality and values in the teaching of ethics makes it
much less likely that lawyers facing a complex ethical problem will be
able to appropriately identify and analyze their ethical obligations.
Finally, we move to the financial crisis of 2008. Here, there
were many phenomena that contributed to the event.87 The involvement of lawyers related to their role in designing and approving new
financial instruments and disclosing (or not disclosing) information related to those instruments that sellers and buyers relied on to make
their decisions. There is debate about whether lawyers bear any responsibility at all for what occurred.88 Many maintain that the new fi85

Id. at 515 (quoting Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics and
Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 9, 37 (2002)).
86
Id. at 518.
87
See generally Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2011, at A1.
88
Compare Claire A. Hill, Who Were the Villains in the Subprime Crisis, and
Why it Matters, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 323, 344 (2010) (“In any event, lawyers were not themselves involved in anything they knew or had reason to suppose
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nancial instruments that were created are still a good idea and an example of an innovative and exciting way to develop new financial
products.89 These same scholars opine that the problem lay not with
the products themselves or with the lawyers but with the perverse incentives that they created and which were unchecked by regulation.90
Even assuming this contention is true, there remains consensus
that if there were stronger, more effective legal advisors, some of the
consequences could have been forecast and minimized if not avoided
altogether.91 Without getting too mired in the details of the financial
transactions and the lawyers involved, what is relevant for our purposes is determining whether an analysis of the myriad role acts that were
requested, using Luban’s theory, could have been helpful.
One small part of the beginnings of the crisis was the development of a vehicle that pooled subprime loans with other prime loans.92
It seemed like an ingenious creation, allowing low-income borrowers
to purchase homes and lenders to reduce or eliminate their risk while
further allowing a chain of investors to earn profits. In a strong real estate market, it is easy to see why this appeared to be a win-win. As defaults on the subprime loans increased, however, there should have
been a re-thinking of the vehicle. Instead, market players not wanting
to look back, simply increased the numbers of subprime loans.93
was fraudulent or even deeply flawed.”), with Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too)
Comfortable: In-House Lawyers, Enterprise Risk, and the Financial Crisis, 2012
WIS. L. REV. 495, 517 (2012) (“To date, we lack the ‘smoking gun’ evidence of extensive lawyer complicity with client fraud in the aftermath of the financial crisis . . .
.[;] [s]till, I suspect that some lawyers were close enough to those events that they
could have functioned as gatekeeper if willing and able.”).
89
See Hill, supra note 88, at 324.
90
See, e.g., id.at 348–49 (suggesting “better monitoring of ‘systematic risk’”
and “adjustments of compensation structures of investment bankers” as possible solutions); Shaun Barnes, Kathleen G. Cully & Steven L. Schwarcz, In-House Counsel’s Role in the Structuring of Mortgage-Backed Securities, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 521,
531–32 (2012) (“[C]ompensation structures that reward accomplishing short-term
goals like the successful negotiation of a deal or the execution of an asset transfer,
can be perverse incentives for managers.”); Brian E. Berger, The Professional Responsibility of Lawyers and the Financial Crisis, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 3, 11
(2011) (“[E]fforts aimed at reducing harm should focus not on lawyer conduct but on
whether to legally prohibit or otherwise limit potentially harmful transactions.”).
91
See generally Langevoort, supra note 88; Schwarcz, supra note 71; Berger,
supra note 90.
92
Hill, supra note 88, at 329–30.
93
See id. at 341.
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Originators realized that since they sold the loans almost immediately, whatever problems might arise with bad loans would not
face them. They reasoned that they bore no responsibility beyond following legal disclosure requirements for ensuring that what the buyers
purchased was viable. Thus, satisfying themselves that they were doing nothing wrong, the number of subprime deals that were created,
packaged, and sold increased precipitously with little to no regard
about the quality of the loans being packaged.94 The development was,
of course, gradual, and therefore easier in hindsight to pinpoint then it
was as it was occurring. Nevertheless, it should have become clear at
some point to the lawyers that the deals were moving too quickly for a
“full and thorough review.”95 As Claire Hill notes, the lawyers “probably did notice . . . that the loans they were helping to securitize were
being made to borrowers of steadily declining quality . . . . But they also knew that the transaction structure was designed precisely to carve
out some high-quality interests from pools of low-quality mortgages.”96
Professor Donald Langevoort puts perspective on this kind of
detail that lends plausibility and sympathy to the lawyers’ involvement. As he explains, among the several possible explanations for “intermediary behavior,” “[T]here was a systematic under-appreciation of
the risk on both the sell and buy sides.”97 How this under-appreciation
occurred can be traced to the gradual eroding of “professional independence” through market changes that included, as Gordon and Batson noted with respect to the Enron scandal, a diffusion of legal work
across multiple lawyers, a financial incentive system that rewarded
lawyer deal-making rather than lawyer-provided advice and restraint,
and the development of complex financial instruments and transactions
that were beyond legal training.98 These conditions created a “cognitive co-dependency” that has resulted in lawyer habits of blessing corporate proposals rather than scrutinizing them critically.99
Thus, with the financial crisis of 2008, it is difficult to pinpoint
individual lawyer ethical lapses. What emerges is a picture of collective corporate representation that fostered support for facilitating more
94

Id.
Id.
96
Id.
97
Langevoort, supra note 88, at 498.
98
Id. at 498–99.
99
Id.
95
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business—at any cost—rather than restraint on business practices that
would sufficiently account for ethical implications. The issue, then, is
not how to prevent one particular lawyer act but rather how to develop
and sustain the cognitive independence necessary to provide ethical
lawyering support.100
At various points during the years leading up to the melt-down,
lawyers were asked to provide advice regarding the legality of financial products that would cost the corporations less and earn them more,
to sanction contract enforcement procedures that were more efficient
regardless of whether such procedures comported with evidentiary requirements, and to not involve themselves in internal matters despite
receiving multiple reports regarding the corporation’s own ethical
handling of those matters. Each of these actions or inactions provided
opportunities for the lawyers to deliberate in the fashion suggested by
Luban. Had they done so, the justification of role could not have been
outweighed by the moral obligation to speak up when dire consequences of conduct could be predicted and, if necessary, abandon the
role or the role act when continuing was not morally justified. Lawyers’ role of providing advice regarding the legality of a particular
product or transaction requires in depth investigation of the facts and
law surrounding the creation of the product and the transaction. Such
an investigation takes time and, had it been done, could have slowed
down some of the poorest transactions that lead to the crash. Abandoning their role act of investigation because, as zealous advocates, they
were required to provide “advice” to their clients quickly, was not justified.
Critics of this assessment will point out that this argument is
somewhat circular since most scholars agree that a large factor in the
100

This, of course, rests on the assumption that cognitive independence is actually important to ethical corporate representation. In the context of the Enron collapse, we have briefly touched on the differing views of lawyer role for a corporation: the gatekeeper vs. the advocate. As with the depth of investigative functions, it
is my contention that cognitive independence is necessary regardless of how the corporate lawyer defines her role. It is only by continually maintaining objectivity that a
person can identify and attempt to resolve potential problems with corporate proposals and behavior. And this is not to suggest, as others have, that this means that a
lawyer starts to tell the corporation how to make business decisions. The suggestion
is merely, as stated by Steven Schwarcz, that a lawyer should undertake to understand the business and legal ramifications of the decisions being proposed so that the
legal and societal ramifications can be discussed with her client. Schwarcz, supra
note 71, at 225–26.
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failure of lawyer intermediaries was the overwhelming volume and
speed of client demands that prevented any possibility of the thorough
investigation that we now believe could have mitigated some of the
damage.101 Additionally, as stated prior to beginning this analysis, the
above is an oversimplification of the deliberative process suggested by
Luban as well as an overly formulaic application of a concept applied
to situations that were more complex than the analysis suggests. These
are fair criticisms and should not be ignored.
Again, however, the analysis suggests not a magic formula to
avert world crises. Rather, it provides support for the possibility of developing a kind of morally deliberative habit. Certainly, the possibility
of such a lawyer transformation is much more likely if the theoretical
underpinnings were part of assigned readings and discussions for not
just two or three cases, but ten or twenty.
My larger point is that all lawyers, prior to becoming licensed
to practice, must go through an education that is so thorough with respect to ethics theory and practice that it forms a habit of ethical issue
identification and resolution. This level of ethics education is currently
missing. Therefore, while arguably corporate client demand would not
be different in a post-teaching law firm world, presumably, the
strength of lawyer habit, when shared by all lawyers available and engaged in corporate representation, could more successfully have withstood the demand and pushed back, insisting on time and resources to
investigate properly.
B. The Connection between Teaching Morally Activist Lawyering and
Addressing the Access to Justice Issue
I have argued that moral activism can do much for assisting the
lawyer in resolving conflicts between role obligations and common
morality. It is useful as an ethical tool for practitioners and could have
substantially reduced the harmful role of the lawyers involved in three
large historical events with wide-reaching, disastrous implications.
Given this fact, shouldn’t we find a way to teach future lawyers about
this theory and how to apply it?
101

See Sarah Kellogg, Financial Crisis 2008: Where Were the Lawyers?,
DCBAR (Jan. 2010), http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/publications/
washington_lawyer/january_2010/financial_crisis.cfm (discussing competitiveness
and boom mentality as contributing to the financial crisis).
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I suggest that creating a teaching law firm that serves the goal
of meeting access to justice needs will do exactly this. It will provide a
context in which every-day ethical dilemmas involving role conflict
will arise and be grappled with by new lawyers in a supervised setting
that provides time and space to explore the appropriate ethical responses to these dilemmas. This is not to suggest that as part of the
more traditional law school curriculum, podium courses offering readings and discussions about ethics and jurisprudence are ineffective or
should be eliminated. What Luban and the application of Luban’s theories in the contexts described above teaches, however, is that the
complexity of learning habits of ethical reasoning demand more than a
one semester podium course. Experiential learning theories, discussed
more fully in Part II provide us with support for the notion that traditional ethics courses must be supplemented by “ethics-in-action” learning opportunities.
While these opportunities may be provided in a traditional clinic setting, the limitations of current law school clinics militate against
relying on this venue as the sole source of teaching ethics in the way I
have described. Many, if not most, law schools do not have sufficient
space to ensure that every law student can take a clinic before graduation. Clinics, moreover, are generally only one semester long, during
which time a student will represent at most three clients. Finally, clinical students generally participate on a part-time basis, so that they
must divide their time between their clinical education and their other
law school obligations. Given both the discussion about the absence of
ethical deliberative habit, and its consequences, above, and the comparison to medical schools, which require post-medical school residency programs despite two years of clinical rotations during medical
school, it is clear that clinical education as it is currently conceived is
insufficient. Additionally, regarding the access to justice issue, the
clinics themselves, although contributing a great deal towards providing representation to those who cannot afford it are, in the bigger picture, much too small in their impact given the level of need.
At least one law professor, who also has her Masters in Public
Health, speaks of one of the medical model’s “primary advantages . . .
over law schools” as “the luxury of time.”102 As she examines the ben102

Jennifer S. Bard, “Practicing Medicine and Studying Law”: How Medical
Schools Used to Have the Same Problems We Do and What We can Learn from
Their Efforts to Solve Them, 10 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 135, 155 (2011).
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efits of the medical school model, Jennifer Bard stops short of advocating its large-scale adoption because she does not challenge the current time-limited three-year law school education. By pointing to the
variety of sources of government funding for medical education that
do not currently exist for legal education, 103 Bard essentially echoes
critiques that a restructured legal education would prove too expensive
and not truly analogous. While I address both of these concerns later,104 I raise her particular articulation of them here as an admission
that the barriers to the creation of a teaching law firm modeled after a
teaching hospital are not at all theoretical. In other words, that law
schools, as they currently operate, do not have the time or the money
to create a post-graduate law residency program does not mean that
law schools are sufficiently meeting the goal of teaching effective
lawyer thought processes, practices, and skills.
Whether barriers to adding more experiential offerings to the
law school curriculum (during or post-law school) are cost or pedagogically-related is a long standing debate within the legal community.
The 1992 MacCrate Report, issued by the ABA but heavily influenced
by clinical professors, focused primarily on the gap between legal education, as it then stood, and the legal profession.105 Specifically, the
report developed a “Statement of Fundamental Lawyering Skills and
Fundamental Values,”106 which are “central to the role and functioning
of lawyers in practice.”107 It then analyzed ways in which these skills
and values were being taught and made recommendations for, among
other things, curricular expansion of these teaching methods.108 A flurry of critical publications—some decrying the costs of implementation
of its recommendations and others denying that legal education was in
need, pedagogically, of such major transformations as those recommended—followed in its wake.109

103

See id. at 154.
See infra Part III.
105
See generally A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT–AN EDUCATIONAL
CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION:
NARROWING THE GAP (1992) [hereinafter “MACCRATE REPORT”].
106
Id. at 121–221.
107
Russell Engler, The MacCrate Report Turns 10: Assessing its Impact and
Identifying Gaps We Should Seek to Narrow, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 109, 113 (2001).
108
MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 105, at 32 –38.
109
Id. at 117–18.
104
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Citing to a 2011 White Paper by the National Health Policy Forum, Bard states,
“Agreement is longstanding in the medical profession that undergraduate medical education is
insufficient to prepare freshly minted MDs for
hands-on independent medical practice.” The
current system of extended postgraduate, hospital-based training, commonly referred to as
“residency” but called Graduate Medical Education (GME) within the world of US-based
medical training, was developed based on this
common understanding.110
What is made clear by this discussion is that law school clinical
programs, while necessary, are insufficient. Further, law school reliance on clinical programs, which are often limited in size and scope, is
motivated more by cost concerns than evidence that they are sufficient
and most pedagogically appropriate for lawyers.
The importance of the resolution of this debate, and the reason
I raise it here, is critical to the future of legal education. If, as I am
proposing, the real barrier to the creation of a teaching law firm (or at
a minimum a transformative expansion of current clinical offerings) is
cost, application of moral activism theory requires lawyer and societal
commitment to fund this endeavor. Arguments that what we have currently is pedagogically sufficient can be put to rest. At this point, twenty years after issuance of the MacCrate Report, it is no longer defensible to claim that barriers to expansion of skills and values teaching are
pedagogical. There is now an abundance of scholarly work, both in
and out of the legal profession, that document the success of clinical
pedagogy, which are analyzed in Part II below.
Moral activism allows us to see that both the effective ethical
training of lawyers and the democratic imperative of trying to resolve
or substantially reduce the access to justice issue should outweigh concerns of cost. Taking a morally activist stance regarding these issues,
of course, doesn’t eliminate the cost concerns, and so I address the
question of how to fund these firms in Part III. However, it is important to understand how viewing lawyering from a morally activist
110

Bard, supra note 102, at 155–56.
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perspective both motivates and requires lawyers to seek public support
for substantially increased experiential opportunities despite their
costs.
Creating a post-graduate, large-scale teaching law firm that
employs all law school graduates who wish to become licensed attorneys will have a much greater impact on the access to justice problem
as well as a much better chance of truly providing an effective skills
and ethical education. It will engage all new lawyers in fulfilling their
democratic obligations to ensure access to justice for all and respond
to the justified pedagogical criticisms of law schools by creating that
necessary but currently missing bridge to effective practice.
The teaching law firm that I am proposing is a post-graduate
mechanism that provides an opportunity for new law school graduates
to represent live clients and within that context learn how to challenge
the principles of partisanship and accountability of the standard conception. My proposed curriculum provides an opportunity for learning
how to effectively represent clients from a morally activist viewpoint
as well as from a traditionally legal realist view.111 It provides new
lawyers the opportunity to practice law in an “exacting apprenticeship”
that allows for “the steady, incremental development of their individual responsibility.”112 Moral activism not only makes the creation of a
teaching law firm possible but also teaches, after Watergate, Enron,
and the recent financial crisis, that it is necessary.

111

Luban has remarked on the origins of the standard conception of lawyering
as being, in part, from legal education’s theoretical bias towards legal realism. He
speaks of Oliver Wendell Holmes as “the patriarch of realism” and goes on to state,
in the words of Roger Cramton, that legal realism is “the ordinary religion of the
law-school classroom.” LUBAN, supra note 9, at 19, 20. A full discussion of the concept of legal realism is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, I include this
small paragraph and footnote for the point that this theory, which holds that law in
action is never a given and is always contestable because it is, ultimately, the law as
imperfect human beings understand and enforce it, is largely responsible for the
principles of non-accountability and partisanship that are taught in law schools today. It is only by studying the implications of legal realism and the arguments that
refute it that future law students and new lawyers can be trained to re-consider the
standard conception and attempt to adopt a morally activist view.
112
Steven Lubet, Like a Surgeon, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1178, 1181 (2003). As
Lubet goes on to state, “Physicians are purposefully taught to practice their profession in a way that attorneys are not.” Id.
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II. THE MEDICAL MODEL: HIGHLIGHTS & APPLICATIONS TO THE LEGAL
EDUCATION CONTEXT
As a result of the famous 1910 Flexner Report,113 medical education transformed itself from a fairly hodgepodge collection of apprenticeships in hospitals and dispensaries, and lectures in lecture halls to a
standardized, lengthy, costly, and rigorous path. 114 That path consists
of undergraduate medical education, which includes scientific study,
clinical internships, and post-graduate education consisting primarily
of residency programs at large teaching hospitals. The development of
a course of scientific study as a pre-requisite to clinical and postgraduate residencies developed as scientific research and knowledge
expanded.115
Along with the growth in scientific knowledge, came the public
realization that doctors had something incredibly important—and increasingly expensive—to offer. There were a series of developments,
both in medical practice and medical education, which led to an increase in the cost of health care.116 These started with the Flexner Report, which resulted in improved medical education and increased public confidence in the medical profession as a whole.117 However,
subsequent technological advances in health care also raised health
care costs both generally and in hospitals, which had traditionally been
charitable institutions for persons of limited means.118 With these
technological advances, better-trained physicians, and, in the 1930s
and 1940s, the development of antibiotics, purely charitable institu-

113

See generally ABRAHAM FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, BULLETIN NUMBER FOUR (1910) [hereinafter
FLEXNER REPORT].
114
See generally ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4; see also Molly Cooke et al., American Medical Education 100 Years After the Flexner Report, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED
1339 (2006) (summarizing the changes in medical education since Flexner’s 1910
assessment of all medical schools then in operation).
115
See generally ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4.
116
Melissa A. Thomasson, From Sickness to Health: The Twentieth-Century
Development of U.S. Health Insurance, 39 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 233, 235–
36 (2002).
117
Id. at 236.
118
Id. at 235–36.
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tions were no longer financially feasible.119 As a result, hospitals started charging patients for the care that they received.120
Hospitals developed prepaid health care plans—a precursor to
modern American health insurance121—and the real divide between
those who could afford health care and those who could not began.
There was growing recognition that without public support, an increasing number of persons would not be able to afford health care.122 In
addition, there was growing recognition that there was health care
worth having. Finally, the technological and pharmaceutical advances
led to public excitement about the possibilities of research. All of this
led to the public’s willingness to contribute to the ever-growing costs
of health care. Teaching hospitals, supported in large part by federal
and state dollars, permitted the on-going excellent training of doctors
and research scientists while simultaneously ensuring that patients
without financial means could be seen and treated.123 The solution has
not kept health care costs down and is expensive. However, it has significantly positively impacted the issues of doctor training, on-going
medical discovery and patient access.
As I suggested in the introduction, while there are as many articles regarding medical education and how it might be improved as
there are for legal education, American medical training is considered
one of the best in the world.124 It is clear that the methods of teaching
theory and practice that are combined in medical education are working. So, what, precisely are medical educators doing right and how can
those lessons be applied to legal education? In 2005, Lee Shulman,
President of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, wrote an article comparing professional pedagogies. As he describes it, “In professional education, it is insufficient to learn for the

119

Id. at 236.
See id. at 236–37.
121
Id. at 237.
122
See generally L.E. Fishman & J.B. Bentley, The Evolution of Support for
Safety-Net Hospitals, 16 HEALTH AFF. 30 (1997).
123
Id.
124
See QS 2012 World University Rankings by Subject—Medicine, QS TOP
UNIV.,
http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/university-subjectrankings/2012/medicine (last visited Apr. 21, 2013) (ranking several United States
medical schools at the top of the list, with Harvard at number one).
120
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sake of knowledge and understanding alone; one learns in order to engage in practice.”125 The obvious question, then, is how best to do this.
From the time of the Flexner Report, medical educators have
agreed that doing medicine is critical to ensuring that students can
learn best practices for actually engaging in the professional practice
of medicine. But Flexner did more than simply pronounce the importance of experiential learning. A kind of experiential learning was
already abundant at the time that he engaged in his comprehensive
study, in the form of apprenticeships, both formal and informal.126
Flexner, however, recognized that medical education at the time, consisting as it did in an assortment of lectures and apprenticeships, was
not sufficiently organized scientifically or pedagogically to ensure the
delivery of quality health care.127
As described in a recent article, Flexner criticized, “the mediocre quality and profit motive of many schools and teachers . . . and the
nonscientific approach to preparation for the profession.”128 Flexner
felt that both “formal analytic reasoning, the kind of thinking integral
to the natural sciences” and “a clinical phase of education in academically oriented hospitals, where thoughtful clinicians would pursue research stimulated by the questions that arose in the course of patient
care and teach their students to do the same” was critical to a complete
and effective medical education.129 The call for formalized analytic
and comprehensive experiential learning has been repeatedly confirmed as a successful pedagogy through research.130
Shulman, writing almost one hundred years after Flexner, notes
that with professional pedagogies, the attempt is to try to link “key

125

Lee S. Shulman, Pedagogies of Uncertainty, LIBERAL EDUC., Spring 2005,
at 18 (emphasis in original).
126
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 115–16.
127
Cooke et al., supra note 114, at 1341.
128
Id. at 1339.
129
Id.
130
See, e.g., P.W. Teunissen et al., How Residents Learn: Qualitative Evidence for the Pivotal Role of Clinical Activities, 41 MED. EDUC. 763 (2007); see also
Bard, supra note 104, at 152 (“medical education is based upon evidence found in
scholarly literature about what does, and what does not, constitute effective teaching
. . . [c]urriculum development in medical education is a scholarly process that integrates a content area with educational theory and methodology and evaluates its impact . . . they are adopting contemporary best practices in education based on empirical research.”) (citation omitted)..
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ideas and effective practice.”131 In other words, professional pedagogies are trying to create the bridge between theory and practice. Shulman unpacks these overused concepts, however, in a way that is helpful to our understanding of the many facets of what we are trying to
teach:
. . . [A] true professional does not merely practice: he or she performs with a sense of personal
and social responsibility. In the work of a professional, the performances of practice must not
only be skilled and theoretically grounded; they
must be characterized by integrity, by a commitment to responsible, ethical service.132
Ethics, responsibility, and integrity – these sound a lot like values, like common morality as well as role morality. However, Shulman proceeds, “[I]t’s also insufficient to claim that a combination of
theory, practice, and ethics defines a professional’s work; it is also
characterized by conditions of inherent and unavoidable uncertainty.”133 Therein lies the strongest argument for the teaching law firm.
Conditions of uncertainty cannot be re-created through the use
of the hypothetical. A hypothetical client, a hypothetical legal issue, a
hypothetical ruling by a hypothetical judge are all limited by the constraints of the problem set. In the real world, as we well know, uncertainty is a daily, almost hourly, occurrence. A client comes in with a
problem. It is uncertain what is the best strategy for resolving that
problem: the client may not have the resources to execute all possible
strategies; the opposing party may have a great deal of information
that could change the outcome of the problem; the client may not be
sharing everything; or the judge that you will be in front of may have
information of her own that could affect the case. The number of possible uncertainties in a given real life situation are virtually limitless.
So how, asks Shulman, can a professional address and account
for all of these uncertainties? Through the exercise of judgment.134
And how does one exercise judgment in an uncertain situation?
131

Shulman, supra note 125, at 18.
Id. (emphasis in original).
133
Id.
134
Id. at 18–19.
132
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Through “cognizance of the consequences of one’s actions” (i.e., experience).135 Certainly, experience can be gained through reading and
discussing precedents, working as an associate or a clerk in a summer
or part-time job, being a research assistant, volunteering at a non-profit
law office, or participating in a clinical program. So, why isn’t this
enough? Shulman directly compares legal education with medical education and concludes:
[L]awyers are not taught to practice; law
schools are nearly devoid of clinical instruction.
Law schools do a brilliant job of teaching students to think like a lawyer, a marginal job of
teaching students to practice like a lawyer, and
a questionable job of teaching them to be professionals with a set of values and moral commitments. The pedagogies of medicine, however, put enormous emphasis on learning to
practice the profession. Education is a seamless
continuum in which each segment has consequences for all others.136
Certainly, clinical legal education within law schools has exploded within the last fifteen or twenty years,137 so it is perhaps unfair
to state that law schools are nearly devoid of clinical instruction. Nevertheless, despite the wonderful gains, there remains an un-evenness in
clinical offerings, a reticence on the part of many law school administrators to support law clinics and their expansion and division amongst
law school faculty between podium teachers and clinicians.138 Even in
greatly supportive law school environments, where both kinds of faculty are treated equally in terms of expectations, salaries, benefits, and
promotions, there remains a sense that what these two types of faculty

135

Id. at 19.
Id. at 22.
137
See Margaret M. Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical Legal Education for This Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 30–32 (2000).
138
Stephanie M. Wildman, Democracy and Social Justice: Founding Centers
for Social Justice in Law Schools, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 252, 258 (2005) (discussing
the “marginalization” of clinical education); See also Stephen Wizner, Walking the
Clinical Tightrope: Between Teaching and Doing, 4 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION,
GENDER & CLASS 259, 261 (2004) (discussing the gap between “pure clinical instruction” and more traditional “podium” teaching).
136
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do is entirely separate. This division is not a helpful model for future
lawyers.
As far as Shulman’s last criticism about the teaching of professionalism, it sounds very similar to the criticism that Luban raised
about the standard conception of the lawyer role.139 In fact, a more accurate characterization of what currently occurs in law school is not a
failure to teach lawyer values, but rather a failure to teach those values
within the bigger context of common morality. Graduating law students are well aware of the professional values and obligations of loyalty, confidentiality, and zeal. As Luban points out, what, they have a
tremendous amount of difficulty doing, however, is addressing these
professional values when they come into conflict with common morality.140 It is the process of learning how to identify and address this conflict that is critical to making the transformation from thinking like a
lawyer to exercising the good judgment of a professional lawyer.
Medical education accomplishes the transformative process of
becoming a professional precisely because of those educators’ understanding that “[a]t the center of this pedagogy is the idea of formation:
the recognition that teaching and learning are about much more than
transferring facts or even cognitive tools.”141 It is well recognized
among medical educators that repetitive experiences with multiple patients provides what Shulman calls the “signature pedagogies” that allows for complex thought as well as mastery of routine procedures.142
In fact, it is precisely the habitual, routinized process of medical
rounds that provides the mental space to engage in learning about
more complex patient-related issues.143
Clinical law teaching pedagogy similarly advocates for this focus on the transformative process of learning and the irreplaceable
value of live client experiences. Clinical education is regarded as a
method of teaching, rather than as a broad and vague label for any kind
of hands-on experience. More specifically, it is a method of teaching

139

See LUBAN, supra note 9, at xx.
Id.
141
J. Donald Boudreau, Sylvia R. Cruess & Richard L. Cruess, Physicianship:
Educating for Professionalism in the Post-Flexnarian Era, 54 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY &
MED. 89, 99 (2011).
142
Shulman, supra note 125, at 22.
143
See id.
140
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students “how to learn from experience.”144 While the expense of clinical legal education has been an ongoing criticism, both in financial
and temporal terms, legal educators have largely embraced its effectiveness in bridging the gap between theory and skills.145
There are also ongoing debates about what is most effective: a
traditional in-house clinic, a field clinic, or an externship in a law office.146 While there is some data available about the effectiveness of
clinical education and the traditional in-house variety in teaching certain skills,147 there is very little data that provide support for favoring
one type of experiential learning over another. It makes intuitive sense,
however, that if we agree that reflection is a key component to learning how to learn from experience, a hands-on opportunity where there
are too many cases or a teacher-supervisor who is not reflective herself
is going to provide less of an educational benefit then would an opportunity to work with smaller case-loads and appropriately reflective
teachers. Most educators, however, feel that offering a variety of experiential learning opportunities is good, although schools that seem to
favor one experiential type over another may suffer criticism from
clinical teachers.
Regardless of the differences in currently available experiential
opportunities, it still appears from this review that a great deal is being
done currently to address the need for transformative educational ex-

144

Barry et al., supra note 137, at 17 (arguing that the primary goal of clinical
programs is learning through experience).
145
Id. at 20–30 (discussing the costs of law school clinics and various methods
to reduce them); Jessica Dopierala, Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practice:
Why are Students Falling Off the Bridge and What are Law Schools Doing to Catch
Them? 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 429, 443 (2008) (discussing clinical education as
the main method law schools employ as a bridge between theory and practice); Suzanne V. Carey, An Essay on the Evolution of Clinical Legal Education and Its Impact on Student Trial Practice, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 509, 527–41 (2003) (discussing
the benefits of clinical legal education on law students).
146
James E. Moliterno, On the Future of Integration Between Skills and Ethics
Teaching: Clinical Legal Education in the Year 2010, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 67, 77
(1996) (explaining debate between in-house clinics and externships); Ann M. Cavazos, The Journey Toward Excellence in Clinical Legal Education: Developing, Utilizing and Evaluating Methodologies for Determining and Assessing the Effectiveness
of Student Learning Outcomes, 40 SW. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2010) (explaining functional
differences between in-house clinics and externships).
147
See generally Stefan H. Krieger, The Effect of Clinical Education on Law
Student Reasoning: An Empirical Study, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 359 (2008).
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periences in legal education. Why, then, is this not sufficient? There
are four reasons.
First, what currently exists is not enough. There are many
schools that make some form of experiential learning mandatory but
these are by far the minority of schools.148 Additionally, because of the
costs of clinical education, those schools that do require experiential
learning treat many different kinds and qualities of experiences as
equivalent and sufficient.149 Finally, even for those fortunate students
who have the opportunity to enjoy the “Cadillac” clinic experience,
they do so on a part-time basis, while juggling other classes and parttime jobs and rarely do so for more than a semester.150 Too many law
students graduate without ever having had one experience with a live
client. For those that have had these experiences, they are generally
short-lived. If the idea is to learn from experience, surely the more experience one has from which to learn, the more effective one will be!
This is certainly what medical education research has taught us.
148

According to a recent clinical teacher’s Listserv survey, sixteen of the approximately 202 ABA-approved or provisionally approved law schools in the United
States require credit-bearing clinics or externships for graduation: 1) CUNY 2)
Thomas Cooley 3) Gonzaga University 4) University of California-Irvine 5) University of Dayton 6) University of Detroit, Mercy 7) University of District of Columbia
8) University of Maryland 9) University of Montana 10) University of New Mexico
11) University of Puerto Rico 12) University of Washington 13) University of St.
Thomas, Minneapolis and 14) Washington & Lee 15) Northeastern University 16)
University of Connecticut Law School. E-mail from Professor Karen Tokarz, Washington University School of Law, Oct. 9, 2012 (on file with the author). This means
that credit-bearing clinics or externships are required for law school graduates in less
than 10% of United States accredited law schools.
149
Kimberly E. O’Leary, Clinical Law Offices and Local Social Justice Strategies: Case Selection and Quality Assessment as an Integral Part of the Social Justice Agenda of Clinics, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 335, 337–39 (2005) (noting the failure
of law school clinics to apply a uniform method of evaluation as a disservice to the
professional development of law students). Note, as well, that twenty years ago the
MacCrate Report devoted an entire section to discussing the relative merits of inhouse clinics versus externships. Without expressing, for the moment, a preference
between the two, what is important to highlight is that there are significant differences. Most educators agree that the optimal goal is for a student to have the opportunity to engage in myriad experiential opportunities – from in-class simulations to
externships to more traditional clinics. As these experiences all have slightly different pedagogical goals, educators also agree that they are not interchangeable. See also ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 165–205 (2007).
150
Margaret M. Barry, et al., Teaching Social Justice Lawyering: Systematically Including Community Legal Education in Law School Clinics, 18 CLINICAL L.
REV. 401, 450–51 (2012).
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Second, there is no substitute for seeing the standard conception of lawyering in action and using theories of moral activism to
challenge that conception and learn to identify and address role conflicts. As we have seen, assisting a client in resolving a problem, regardless of the nature of the problem and the strategy being considered, has ramifications that not only must be identified but also are
often not easily addressed.151 Experience in the field not only helps reinforce classroom learning about ethics, it also provides the habit of
solving problems ethically.
Third, the reach of Legal Services Corporation lawyers is limited. Admittedly, they have helped thousands of low income Americans and have done so often in near impossible conditions: with no resources for hiring experts or getting the latest technology, in shrinking
offices with little to no administrative support.152 They have shouldered unimaginably enormous and complex caseloads for very little
compensation. They are, for many, modern day heroes. However, the
unremitting dwindling of government support resulting in increasingly
restricted work and continuously shrinking budgets is crippling and
rendering them ineffective.153 Creating a teaching law firm the size of
a teaching hospital, where most of the law schools’ graduates will
handle between three and five low-income cases per rotation, would
provide the large-scale effort necessary to seriously address this issue.
A teaching law firm could renew the possibility of equal access to justice while simultaneously ensuring that all lawyers are fulfilling their
duty to be actively engaged in providing such access.

151

Schwarcz, supra note 70, at 222 (acknowledging that “[a]ll transactions
create externalities” and recommending that lawyer education work to help future
lawyers identify and discuss them). Although Schwarcz argues that educators should
teach future lawyers how to identify and address externalities, an obligation, imposing liability, should not be placed on lawyers to do this as it is impossible to know
when lawyers or clients have more knowledge about consequences of a particular
transaction or proposal. Id. at 223–24.
152
LEGAL SERV. CORP., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 2, 3 (2011); Press Release, Legal Serv. Corp., Funding Cuts Expected to Result in Nearly 750 Fewer Staff Positions at LSC-Funded Programs (August 15, 2012), available at
http://www.lsc.gov/media/press-releases/funding-cuts-expected-result-nearly-750fewer-staff-positions-lsc-funded; Press Release, Legal Serv. Corp., House-Senate
Agreement Cuts LSC Funding (November 15, 2011), available at
http://www.lsc.gov/media/press-releases/house-senate-agreement-cuts-lsc-funding.
See Heather Rogers, The Relentless Push to Bleed Legal Services Dry, REMAPPING
DEBATE (June 6, 2012), www.remappingdebate.org/node/1304.
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Fourth and finally, while law students can practice in many
arenas under certain circumstances under state student practice
rules,154 they cannot practice in any arena. Law students have not, after
all, completed their legal education prior to taking on the enormous responsibility for preventing a client from becoming homeless, representing an abused child or assisting a disabled client from getting desperately needed income benefits. Despite these limitations, as is seen
by the large variety of growing clinical programs and literature, traditional clinical legal education, prior to graduation from law school, is
very effective. For that reason, and for reasons similar to the justifications for the clinical model in medical education, I do not propose replacing undergraduate clinical legal education with the graduate teaching law firm. Adding a post-graduate teaching law firm, however,
would ensure that the vast number of low-income persons receiving
free representation would be represented by J.D.s rather than law students.
For all of these reasons, my proposal does not involve simply
creating either a traditional law firm or a traditional legal aid office
and forcing students to practice within it. I have had the experiences of
supervising law students as a staff attorney in a traditional legal aid office, teaching law students in a field clinic that resembled my supervisory experience but added a seminar component that I also taught, supervising a student in an externship, and teaching a traditional inhouse clinic. Between the extensive research that has already been
done and my own personal experiences, I am convinced that a teaching
law firm that does not provide support for true clinical teaching methodology will not create effective lawyers.155
If we are to truly learn from our mistakes and our own experiences as educators, an effective teaching law firm will provide support
for low case-loads for students, traditional scholarship for the lawyer154

See, e.g., PA. BA. R. 322 (2012); Peter A. Joy, Political Interference with
Clinical Legal Education: Denying Access to Justice, 74 TUL. L. REV. 235, 267
(1999) (noting all states currently have student practice rules in place); Barrett Halls,
‘I’ll Supervise, Your Honor’ Ethical and Legal Considerations Arising from the Use
of Law Students in Court Proceedings, 36 J. LEGAL PROF. 225, 226–27 (2011).
155
As one observer notes in stating that legal education currently has no
equivalent to the comprehensive training provided to doctors, “Even at large law
firms, where the flow of work and long hours bear some resemblance to teaching
hospitals, the assignment of associates is almost exclusively profit-driven, with little
similarity to the methodological exposure of medical residents to cases . . . .” LUBET,
supra note 112, at 1181.
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professors, and ongoing reflection meetings that provide students with
the opportunity to continually engage in collegial consultation about
how various situations were handled as well as how various situations
should be handled. For this type of experience, in addition to looking
at our own history and variety of experiential opportunities, the teaching hospital is an excellent model.
III. PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE ISSUE AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CREATION OF A TEACHING LAW FIRM
Having made the case in Part I that lawyers’ “special responsibility to the quality of justice” includes actively addressing the access
to justice issue,156 the question remains whether there are sufficient
grounds for society in general to take responsibility for addressing this
issue. Given that the justification for the necessity of the people’s lawyer is political, rather than moral, it seems clear that the answer is yes.
Our system of government is premised on the notion of equality before the law. While practically speaking an impoverished person
can physically walk into a courthouse and be heard by a judge, we
have known since Gideon v. Wainwright157 that such physical access
will rarely, if ever, result in any meaningful ability to defend oneself or
obtain requested relief.
Our refusal to ensure legal representation in civil contexts,
however, is not because of a feeling that in those contexts unrepresented folks are better able to make their case than in the criminal one. Rather, the refusal is based on the belief that in the civil context, as matters are brought by private parties, the indigent litigant is not forced to
prosecute or defend her claims against the awesome power of the state.
The right to counsel in the criminal context, as well as many other important rights, is more about concern for balance when the adversary is
the government then it is about particularized concern for the indigent
litigant.158
156

See supra Part I.
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
158
I am summarizing here what Luban compellingly shows in great detail over
the course of several chapters, that “criminal defense is an exceptional part of the legal system, one that aims at the people’s protection from the state rather than accurate outcomes.” LUBAN, supra note 9, at 63. Interestingly, Luban also discusses the
fact that in “today’s” civil litigation, a private indigent litigant is as likely to be facing the awesome power of the corporate giant, whose wealth and consequent access
157
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As Luban highlights, however, the lesson of Gideon is not only
about the need to guard against the awesome power of the state. The
decision also teaches that meaningful access to the legal system is not
access to a courtroom without knowledge of the workings of the courtroom, the details of the laws being applied there, and an understanding
of those details.159
Pepper articulates this point as well in describing his theory of
first-class citizenship. As he explains,
[I]n a highly legalized society such as ours, autonomy is often dependent upon access to the
law. Put simply, first-class citizenship is dependent on access to the law. And while access
to law . . . is formally available to all, in reality
it is available only through a lawyer.160
Since equal access to the law is one legitimizing principle, denying
that access by refusing to ensure legal representation for all delegitimizes the government. The interest in ensuring a legitimate government, that is one that will not generate a right of resistance, is not
only an interest for lawyers. Hence, the responsibility to ensure equal
access to justice is a public one.
Why does this matter? For economic reasons. Law schools
alone cannot fund a proposal as extensive as a large-scale postgraduate teaching law firm. In the introduction to this paper, I mentioned the increasing drum-beat about law school failures after the
economic crisis. As one law professor has recently stated, “The economic model of law schools is broken. The cost of a legal education
today is substantially out of proportion to the economic opportunities
obtained by the majority of graduates.”161The numbers of new law
schools accredited by the ABA has steadily risen, flooding the market
with new lawyers while the market for lawyer jobs has steadily
to lawyers, knowledge, technology and the politically powerful is certainly as terrifying, if not more so, then the government. Id. at 64–65. Given this reality, the justification of limiting free lawyers to indigent criminal defendants is quite weak. For our
purposes, however, whether or not the litigant opposing an indigent is large and
powerful has no bearing on the reality of the complexities of our justice system.
159
Id. at 245.
160
Pepper, supra note 19, at 617 (internal citations omitted).
161
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS x (2012).
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shrunk.162 Given the tuition increases, more scrutiny than ever before
is being given to the traditional three-year law school model. Law
school graduates and critics of the current law school educational system have been asking increasingly whether the same things can be accomplished in less time and for less money.163
Perhaps the answer is yes. But my proposal implicitly deals
with the effectiveness question, which is not something that can be
dealt with by simply throwing away all of the important theoretical
and clinical teaching that is currently happening. It also deals with the
access to justice issue, something that none of the current outcries address, other than to notice the vast number of law graduates without
jobs and the even vaster number of low-income persons without access
to legal representation. In sticking with these two issues, then, I will
not comment on the question of what undergraduate legal education
should look like other than to suggest that some combination of theoretical and clinical teaching similar to what currently exists be retained.
My proposal of the graduate teaching law firm comes from a
growing belief that whatever forms of undergraduate legal education
are undertaken, it is not enough to accomplish the twin goals of teaching professionalism, as that term has been defined and analyzed by
Shulman, and addressing the access to justice issue. Bridging the gap
between theory and practice; forming deliberative habits of identifying, assessing, and addressing role conflicts and seriously and significantly addressing the access to justice issue are things better accomplished at the post-graduate level, as we have seen with medical
education. Meeting these goals should be a societal as well as a lawyer
imperative. And if that is true, then government funding should play a
large role in legal education.

162

J. Gordon Hylton, Looking at the Increase in the Number of Law Schools
and Law Students, 1950–2010, MARQUETTE UNIV. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (July 25,
2012), http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2012/07/25/looking-at-the-increase-inthe-number-of-law-schools-and-law-students-1950-2010/; Catherine Rampell, The
Lawyer Surplus, State by State, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2011, 11:00 AM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/27/the-lawyer-surplus-state-by-state/.
163
See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, The Economics of Law School, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 24, 2012, 3:01 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/24/the-economicsof-law-school/.
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Here, it is necessary to pause a moment to acknowledge that in
the midst of an economic crisis affecting the world, the nation, and the
legal market, including law schools, I am proposing a commitment of
more funds rather than a scaling back. My response to this predictable
criticism is to look at other moments of economic crises in our history—and governmental response.
There are many sources, the most obvious to me being President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s response to the Great Depression
and President Obama’s response to the current financial crisis. Economists and politicians alike debate whether these government spending
responses were the right responses to make, whether they were effective or whether austerity was the more logical and appropriate response, and some even say that the large scale spending that did take
place was not nearly sufficient and should have even been greater than
it was. I am clearly not going to be able to resolve these debates within
this paper. I raise them as a reference point merely to show that while
there is a significant amount of scholarship on both sides of the issue,
my proposal is in line with the literature that suggests that economic
crises require more spending, not less.164
I said in the beginning of the paper that I would devote this
section to economic and practical considerations. Here I would like to
do just that by discussing the detailed vision of my teaching law firm
and how, beyond government contributions and addressing the moral
dimensions of lawyering, it can be sustained and remain practically enriching.
You will recall that one of the early and frequent criticisms of
even attempting to discuss a teaching law firm like a teaching hospital
is that law and medicine are not truly analogous. More specifically,
poor people have the same anatomy, circular, and vascular systems as
wealthy people because they are human beings. Therefore, medical
164

For a brief sampling of articles in favor of government spending in times of
recession, see Greg Hannsgen & Dimitri Papadimitriou, Did the New Deal Prolong
or Worsen the Great Depression, 53 CHALLENGE 63, 80 (2010) (concluding after extensive analysis that FDR’s stimulus was likely not large enough, as opposed to too
large, to have the impact his administration hoped); Arjun Jayadev & Mike Konczal,
When is Austerity Right? In Boom, Not Bust, 53 CHALLENGE 37, 39 (2010); Michael
Grunwald, Think Again: Obama’s New Deal, FOREIGN POL., September-October
2012, at 45, 47; Peter Temin, The Great Recession & The Great Depression, 139
DAEDAELUS 115 Fall (2010) .
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residents who treat primarily low-income patients will learn just as
much as if they were treating all wealthy patients. All of their
knowledge will be transferable to any practice they choose because
diseases and injuries do not discriminate between rich and poor.
Legal problems, however, most certainly do. Thus, a legal resident completing rotations in, for example, landlord-tenant law, mortgage foreclosure defense, and social security disability income benefit
appeals will not be well equipped to land a post-residency job in a
large law firm representing a multi-million dollar corporation; neither
will a lawyer completing an immigration rotation, a family law rotation, or a rotation dealing with debtor-side consumer issues. These are
fair criticisms.
I therefore suggest as a response to these criticisms, as well as
a possible source of funding contribution, that rotations in real estate,
corporate merger, tax, and many other traditionally private firm contexts be part of our teaching law firm. And before it is predictably
cried, “But then what of the access to justice mission?” I suggest that
all rotations be considered as potential links in a chain of specialization.
So, for example, all residents would be required to represent
low-income clients in at least one-third of their total rotations. Residents with an interest in private practice real estate would do their lowincome rotation representing low-income tenants and low-income
homeowners in mortgage foreclosure matters. However, they could also do rotations in real estate, tax, and even small business representation. Similarly, residents wanting to specialize in international business
could include low-income rotations in immigration and could also do
rotations in international business, small business, tax, or other related
legal fields. Clients seeking representation in the private rotations
would pay sliding scale rates and those fees would be used to support
the work of the firm. Clinical professor advisors could assist students
in creating a series of related rotations that would ready them for a
specialized practice in an area of interest.

Foreseeable complications would be conflicts of interest and
opposition from the private bar. As for the former, depending on the
level of conflict, a “Chinese wall” would suffice; however in others,
where an opposing party is low income, the paying client would have
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to find representation elsewhere. Regarding the latter complication, I
think the response is to think realistically about whether truly threatening competition would exist from a teaching law firm.
As a teaching law firm, first and foremost, no lawyer resident
would have more than approximately three clients at a time. Second,
as the private rotations would be for those students that want to specialize in that particular area, not all lawyer residents would rotate
through each private area, which again would limit the number of actual clients served. Third, similar again to teaching hospitals, teaching
law firms would develop their own specialty identities. For example, a
Gary, Indiana teaching law firm might have many rotations that could
lead to specialties in tax and real estate offerings but very little in the
way of international business offerings. Thus, a lawyer in private practice would easily be able to find clients needing representation in specialty areas not taught by that area’s teaching law firm. Finally, a
teaching law firm of the scale that I envision becomes, in and of itself,
a job creator rather than something that threatens law jobs.
These arguments, I believe, take care of the concerns about the
ability to use teaching hospitals as adequately analogous models for
teaching law firms. One other distinction, which only helps the economic concerns, is the fact that law firms will have nowhere near the
costs associated with the equipment and laboratory needs that teaching
hospitals do. Other than computers, printers, and photocopiers, law
firms don’t need expensive equipment. On the whole, while grand and
expensive in terms of person costs, teaching law firms should be
cheaper than teaching hospitals.
Another consideration is the combination of breadth and depth
of experiences that teaching law firms would offer. First, because all
residents would be required to rotate through two or three poverty law
rotations, those residents who also choose private practice rotations
would have the opportunity to see the issues from both sides as well as
the opportunity to gain live client experiences in fields that might only
be tangentially related to their ultimate chosen fields. This could greatly enhance their ability to practice in their chosen fields.
As an example, consider a resident who provides social security benefit income representation during their first year of residency
and then ultimately goes on to do personal injury work. As a direct result of the social security work that the resident did, the resident will
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understand that when representing a plaintiff whose sole source of income is social security benefits, it is likely that prior to any settlement
or resolution of the personal injury action a special needs trust will
have to be created or the plaintiff will lose her benefits upon receipt of
the personal injury action proceeds. Similarly, a resident in a family
law rotation will have a much greater understanding of the implications of divorce when later specializing in bankruptcy or tax law.
A final practical consideration is the chance that teaching law
firms offer to assist law students in gaining expertise with local rules
and connections to local practices. If my vision were to be realized, a
teaching law firm with a focus on a legal area that the resident lawyer
was interested in, which was also geographically situated in a place
that the resident lawyer wanted to ultimately practice upon completion
of the residency program, would not only provide the resident lawyer
with the certifications that she wanted but also with invaluable familiarity and experience with local players and local practice rules and
customs.
In order to have this possibility, it is part of my vision that
many future lawyers would choose to attend two different legal education institutions: a more traditional law school and a post-J.D. teaching
law firm affiliated with a law school different from the one which they
attended. In that way, law schools could retain their unique identities,
class sizes, and faculty, and then create an affiliated teaching law firm
that would gradually, over time, build reputations in specialties that
might or not be similar to those for which the law schools have reputations. Students would seek admissions to a residency program at a particular teaching law firm based on their own interests, perceptions of
the law firm’s reputation, and geographic preferences. Admissions to
the residency programs would be competitive in the same way that
they are for admissions to medical school residency programs, and the
possibility of joining a residency program in the state where you ultimately intend to practice could introduce the possibility of significantly reducing the need for a bar exam.
Bar examinations are traditionally exams created by states in
an effort to ensure that those licensed in the particular state meet the
state’s standards. Much has been written about the lack of worthiness

Miller-Wilson

102

7/11/2013 4:11 PM

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL 13:1

of these exams of acting as any kind of quality control mechanism.165
Actually and successfully representing clients, and therefore clearly
having significant knowledge and understanding of that state’s rules
and procedures, could not be better evidence that the resident in question is qualified for a license in that state.
Certainly there will be instances where a lawyer licensed in one
state wishes to move to and practice in another or where a lawyer attends a residency program in one state but ultimately for a host of reasons, desires to practice in another. For those attorneys, the states will
presumably retain their traditional licensing procedures. But for the
lawyers, presumably the vast majority, who participate in a residency
program in the state where they ultimately practice, the bar exam requirement could be eliminated. Instead, evidence of successful completion of the residency program could be presented in exchange for a
law license. The law school affiliated with that teaching law firm and
the state could determine what evidence would be sufficient.
CONCLUSION
Creating teaching law firms modeled after teaching hospitals, is not a
new idea.166 In fact, a move in this direction has already been undertaken by Arizona State University.167 Nevertheless, the concerns and
165
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criticisms regarding the economic feasibility of such firms and precisely how they would function given the imprecise analogy between
health care and legal assistance are valid. Addressing those concerns
and criticisms fully requires a discussion of the goals of a teaching law
firm.
As I have argued, while there are many practical benefits, the
goals of my proposed teaching law firm are to respond to broader and
more deeply troubling ethical concerns about lawyering in general and
to the crisis in access to justice that is of central concern to our democracy. Consideration of a re-conception of the lawyering idiom holds a
great deal of promise for resolving these issues.

Quinney College of Law in Utah also sees their new building as providing them with
the opportunity to “create a teaching hospital for law.” See College of Law Finalizes
Plans for New Building, ULAWTODAY, http://today.law.utah.edu/2013/01/college-oflaw-finalizes-plans-for-new-building/, (last visited Apr. 22, 2013).

